American University International Law Review
Volume 10 | Issue 4

Article 3

1995

A Festschrift in Honor of Seymour J. Rubin
Claudio Grossman
Tom Farer
Andreas J. Jacovides
Herman Schwartz
Bennett Boskey
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Grossman, Claudio, et al. "A Festschrift in Honor of Seymour J. Rubin." American University International Law Review 10, no. 4
(1995): 1215-1274.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Authors

Claudio Grossman, Tom Farer, Andreas J. Jacovides, Herman Schwartz, Bennett Boskey, William Diebold, and
Christina M. Cerna

This article is available in American University International Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr/vol10/
iss4/3

SEYMOUR

J. RUBIN

FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SEYMOUR J. RUBIN

Opening Remarks
Claudio Grossman
Dean, Washington College of Law
at The American University
It is my honor and pleasure to open this issue of The American University Journal of International Law and Policy dedicated to Emeritus
Professor of Law, Seymour J. Rubin. Professor Rubin has been a distinguished member of the faculty and long-time friend of the Washington
College of Law.
It is very difficult to summarize the tremendous contributions Professor Rubin has made to the field of international law and the Washington
College of Law. In a career spanning more than five decades, Professor
Rubin has played an important role in the effort to shape a new international legal order. He represented the United States on various committees of the United Nations, including the Commission on Transnational
Corporations, the Special Subcommittee of the Security Council, and the
Commission of International Trade. He served as a member of the InterAmerican Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States,
and as the U.S. Member on the Panel of Conciliators for the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Moreover, Professor
Rubin held the posts of Executive Vice-President and Executive Director
of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), from 1975 1982, and worked to expand even further the relevance of one of the
most important associations of scholars and practitioners in the world.
Today, he continues to serve ASIL as a Senior Consultant and Honorary
Vice-President.
As a legal scholar, Professor Rubin has been a prolific writer,
authoring and editing numerous books and articles on various aspects of
international law. His original ideas about transnational corporations,
trade and the environment, and conflict resolution are required reading
material for all scholars, practitioners, and students of international law.
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As a faculty member of the Washington College of Law, where he
continues to teach courses on transnational corporations, Professor Rubin
has been instrumental in building the law school into one of the finest
centers of international law in the United States. In addition to his
teaching responsibilities, Professor Rubin was active in the development
of a unique LL.M. program that today draws over 150 students from 50
countries around the world. In spite of his many activities and obligations, the faculty and students always find in Professor Rubin a valuable
colleague, a trustworthy friend, and a role model as a scholar, a devoted
teacher, and a first-rate practitioner of international law.
The Washington College of Law is proud to recognize the impressive
contribution of Professor Rubin, and to honor him in this issue of The
American University Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy. His example and achievements will continue to inspire our community well into
the next century.

HOMAGE TO A SINGULAR MAN

Tom Farer
"Education does not consist merely in adorning the memory and enlightening the understanding," Joubert wrote in his Nineteenth Century
Pensees. "Its main business should be to direct the will." Education
directed Seymour Rubin to a life of public service and scholarship
which continues now, past his eightieth year.
Although I have known and worked with Sy for over two decades, I
never before quite appreciated the breadth and importance of his service.
Close familiarity, as much as vanity, often makes us a little myopic. In
the day-to-day of existence, we tend to see frequent associates as much
like ourselves, unremarkable. We see them thus until, on the occasion of
some celebration, we are asked to write about them. By defamiliarizing
the subject, writing creates distance. In written form, a man like Rubin
assumes his true height. We look up and see him as if for the first
time.
Before beginning to write, I extracted a copy of Sy's resume from the
Dean's files. Its terseness is eloquent. Had it come from a less confident
man, a vast sprawl of minor recognitions would have surrounded and,
ironically, obscured the spare list of major offices and published works
which reveal a remarkable productivity, an avid energy, and the earned
respect of his peers. Like a visitor from another world, Rubin is one of
the last survivors of a generation of optimistic and practical idealists.
Leading members of it refined the New Deal, fought and managed the
Second World War, and then simultaneously managed the long Cold
War and the coincident European peace. Being human, their achievements were flawed. Still, few generations could claim so many contributions to the mitigation of the human condition.
In the realm of international relations, Rubin and his colleagues were
the principal architects of profound changes in collective mentality and
political structure. They encouraged and assisted the transformation of
* Grazier Fellow, Professor and Director of the Joint-Dagree Program in Law
and International Relations at The American University.
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Western and Northern Europe from a place of coiled mutual hostilities
into a community of states among whom war now seems inconceivable.
By covering that emerging community with a security umbrella and
otherwise subordinating narrowly conceived U.S. economic interests, the
leaders of Rubin's generation augmented the resources available to European governments for building welfare states which vastly reduced and
in some cases virtually eliminated poverty and consolidated democracy.
For the world as a whole, Rubin's generation designed and implemented a set of liberalizing norms and institutions which provided the
framework within which once impoverished peoples found their way to
prosperity. I am hardly blind to the imperfections of the system of trade
and finance which that generation designed or to the misery and poverty
for which it had insufficient answers. However, relative to the national
parochialism that previously prevailed with its pitiless zero-sum games,
the liberal international economic order manages to seem benign. Certainly no previous era in North American and European, much less
world history, has witnessed such sustained (albeit uneven) growth. In
the developed, as well as a fair number of developing states, growth has
coincided with a dramatic augmentation of material well being for most
social classes.
It is in the economic realm, more than any other, that Rubin has
made his mark. He was still short of his thirty-fifth birthday when he
served as the United States delegation's legal advisor at the world conference which negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
still the linchpin of economic order. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
Rubin was prominently engaged at the critical points where political and
economic interests converged: as chief of the United States delegation
negotiating Marshall Plan agreements with European governments, agreements that helped open the road to economic union; as a senior administrator of the country's initial essays in foreign economic assistance
beyond Western Europe; as General Counsel to the restructured and
vastly enlarged program of assistance to the Third World established by
President John F. Kennedy; and as the chief representative to the Development Assistance Committee.
By the 1970s, the three principal focal points of Rubin's remarkable
career became clear. One was geographic and was signified by his election in 1974 to the Inter-American Juridical Committee to which he
would be reelected three times and which he would chair. It in turn
implies a second focal point, namely the progressive development of
international law, an abiding interest of Rubin's which led him to serve
for seven years as the Executive Vice-President and Executive Director
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of the American Society of International Law. The third, overlapping the
other two, was inter-governmental organization, a concern evidenced in
his work on the Juridical Committee, his representation of the United
States in various capacities at the United Nations, and his consultancy
with the Inter-American Development Bank.
In fact, Rubin is too Protean a figure to admit to any neat career
taxonomies. Focused enough to be enormously successful in his main
endeavors, Rubin has nevertheless strayed outside the main lines of his
occupational interests, drawn by the urging of conscience. Nothing better
typifies the human concerns that have always animated him than
Rubin's founding of the Inter-American Legal Services Association.
Through his efforts, Rubin gave the Association permanent institutional
form and quickly transferred full authority to Latin American colleagues.
This achievement typifies Rubin's practical wisdom, his ecumenical sensibility, and, a trait remarkable in successful public people, his ability to
let go of a thing.
Most men would be satisfied and stretched just by public service such
as Rubin's. But for him it was not enough. A doer, Rubin also meditated on what was being done. Even before he left government, Rubin had
begun the scholarly work that has continued to this day and that continues to illuminate the international legal process. His daunting list of
books, contributions to the books of others and articles exposes a man
for whom cerebration is more than service, for whom it is a form of
exalted play.
It was not Rubin's only form of play, I am happy to say. If a man is
only his career, then while we may admire we will not especially like
him. And it is hard not to like this sociable, human, and no less than
gifted and forceful character and to be very glad indeed that he made
the Washington College of Law the academic venue of his distinguished
career.

CYPRUS-THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW DIMENSION"
Andreas J. Jacovides*"

From its inception as an independent state in 1960, Cyprus has always endeavored to abide by the rules of international law, to participate constructively in major United Nations Conferences, and to make
its contribution internationally in such areas as developing compulsory
third party dispute settlement procedures and the adoption of progressive
notions of international law such as jus cogens (peremptory norms from
which no derogation can be allowed by agreement or otherwise).
The all-embracing concern for the people of Cyprus over the past
several decades has been what is generally known as the Cyprus problem. Several phases span the years, from the pre-independence
anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s, to the present grave dimensions of
foreign invasion, continuing occupation, attempted secession, and massive human rights violations. The year 1994 marked the twentieth anniversary of the brutal invasion and occupation of a large part of Cyprus
by the Turkish armed forces, with its disastrous consequences in terms
of human suffering and its implications for international legal order and
for peace in this volatile region. It is the nature and extent of these
consequences, together with the wider issues of principle involved, that
render the Cyprus problem one of international concern which needs to
be urgently addressed and solved. Its continuation is a tragic anachronism in today's world and, even though it may have faded from the
daily headlines and more topical international situations have superseded
it, the issues of principle involved are as valid today as they were twenty years ago.
The Cyprus problem in its basic dimensions is simple and should be
of universal concern. Although it has its constitutional and other aspects,
the Cyprus problem in its essence is an international problem of aggres* Based on a lecture at the University of Virginia Law School's John Bassett
Moore Society of International Law (Nov. 7, 1994).
** Ambassador of Cyprus to the United States.
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sion, invasion, occupation, and of massive violation of human rights. It
involves the illegal invasion and occupation of a small country by a far
larger and militarily much stronger neighbor, bent on imposing by force
its arbitrary prescription of a partitionist political solution; it involves attempted secession in violation of international treaties; it involves the
systematic destruction of the cultural heritage of an ancient land with
thousands of years of history and civilization; it involves "ethnic cleansing" on a massive scale with the forced displacement of practically all
of the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the area under Turkish occupation
(constituting eighty percent of the inhabitants of that area and more than
a third of Cyprus' total population) and the importation of a large number of colonists aimed at altering the historic demographic composition
of the island; and it involves the tragedy of missing persons that raises
humanitarian issues of major significance.
Consequently, the Cyprus question is a test-case of the effectiveness
of the United Nations and of the universal applicability of many of the
most basic rules of international law. There is a solid basis for the
proposition that if the international community had taken effective steps
in 1974 not to allow the victimization of Cyprus through its forcible
division and deliberate massive "ethnic cleansing," similar deplorable
actions in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere would not have taken
place. Bad precedents, when tolerated and condoned, tend to be repeated.
Turkey's illegal actions in Cyprus have received universal disapproval
from the United Nations and from virtually all other international forums. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, which was carried out through the
use of American-supplied arms in violation of American law and bilateral United States-Turkish agreements, raised the "rule of law" issue
and resulted in the arms embargo against Turkey by decision of the
United States Congress.
On numerous occasions, the United Nations Security Council called
for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus, the voluntary
return of refugees to their homes, the cessation of all interference in the
internal affairs of Cyprus, and respect for its sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and unity. Turkey chose to ignore the decisions of
the international community and did so with impunity. This is a very
sad commentary on the state of international legal order.
Despite the international remonstration, the Cyprus Government
showed its goodwill, sense of pragmatism, and genuine wish for a
peaceful solution by entering into negotiations in the conviction that
there is much more that unites all Cypriots than the differences that
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presently divide us. The Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriot
side made a number of painful concessions in the hope that the Turkish
side would respond with reasonable proposals and thus reach a solution.
Basically, we asked for the establishment of a viable and genuine federation based on democratic principles, as in the case of all other federal
states, and with special provisions to meet the particular circumstances
of Cyprus. The demand from the Turkish side called for the establishment of, in effect, two separate states with separate armies, separate
treaty-making capacity, and separate economies. In short, while paying
lip service to a federal system, the Turkish objective remains a
partitionist solution through the legitimization of the internationally condemned invasion.
The Turkish objective is evidenced in the recent position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership as reflected in the resolution adopted in August
1994 by the so-called "Turkish Cypriot Assembly," with the full support
of Ankara, to abandon federation as the only solution to the Cyprus
problem. This proposition is in direct defiance of United Nations resolutions, including the most recent Security Council Resolution on Cyprus' which, in operative paragraph 2, defines very clearly the basis of
a solution of the Cyprus problem. It reaffirms:
the position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus
with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and
comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant
Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bizonal federation, and
that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any
other country or any form of partition or secession!
This recent manifestation of Turkish intransigence in flagrant disregard of the international community's position forces current United Nations efforts to an impasse, with ominous implications for the prospects
of a negotiated settlement. As the Cyprus Government made clear, there
really is no prospect for negotiated progress unless the Turkish Cypriot
leadership unequivocally accepts Resolution 939, including paragraph 2.
The position of the Turkish side can be viewed as a continuation of
the Turkish intransigence displayed earlier in the year in response to the
United Nations' efforts to reach an agreement on a package of confidence-building measures. The Secretary General concluded in his report

1. Res. 939, U.N. SCOR, 3412th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/Res 939 (1994).
2. Id.
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to the Security Council that: "[t]he Security Council finds itself faced
with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side."3 The implications of this conclusion should be clear. Alternative means to implement in practice the many United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and to
tackle the overall Cyprus problem, particularly its more substantive
aspects, in an effective and result-oriented manner, should now be considered as a matter of utmost importance.
Progress towards a negotiated settlement cannot be expected unless
the Turkish side musters up the necessary political will. The necessary
political resolve will not be found unless the factors that sustain Turkish
intransigence are removed. The primary factor is the overwhelming
presence of occupying Turkish troops. The proposal of President
Clerides for the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus represents a
viable resolution to this problem. It is a significant and constructive
proposal with far-reaching implications in terms of meeting the perceived Turkish security concerns, and the much more real security concerns of the Republic of Cyprus, and its acceptance would substantially
enhance the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the situation.
If Turkey respected the relevant principles and rules of international
law, the Cyprus problem, in its basic dimensions of aggression and invasion, continuing occupation, massive violation of human rights, and attempted secession, would not have arisen. By applying international
principles and rules, this situation could be resolved in a manner that is
fair to all Cypriots and consistent with the legitimate interests of the
States involved. The international legal option is particularly relevant in
light of the impasse to which the Turkish intransigence has led the
negotiating process. Third party determination of the legal issues involved in the Cyprus situation, preferably by the main judicial organ of
the United Nations, the International Court of Justice in the Hague,
would go a long way towards promoting a just solution. Cyprus would
have an iron-clad case before the International Court of Justice. Under
the present stalemated situation, recourse to such an international forum
offers significant possibilities and could be brought about in the absence
of Turkey's consent to adjudication through a request by the Security
Council or by the General Assembly of the United Nations for an advisory opinion on the issue by the International Court of Justice.

3. Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,
U.N. Doe. S/1994/629 (1994).
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As early as 1963, the Cyprus Government turned to the United Nations Security Council seeking protection against outside threats and acts
of aggression. The present situation in Cyprus-traceable from the JulyAugust 1974 Turkish invasion and continuing occupation, forcible expulsion of one third of the Greek Cypriot population, massive violation of
human rights, attempts to alter the demographic composition of the
island through the introduction of colonists from Turkey, the tragic issue
of missing persons, and the illegal attempt at secession of the occupied
area in November 1983-has global implications going far beyond the
narrow geographic confines of Cyprus. This unremedied state of affairs,
involving a gross violation of many of the most basic norms of international law, including peremptory norms of jus cogens, ought to be of
grave concern to all who believe in the universal protection of human
rights and the application of democratic principles and the rule of law.
The issues involved pose a challenge to the international legal order, to
the United Nations, and to the United States as a global power and the
leader of the Western alliance.
The criminal coup d'etat of July 15, 1974 inspired by the junta then
ruling Greece, against the legitimate and democratically-elected President
of Cyprus, gave Turkey the long-sought opportunity to invade Cyprus in
order to impose its will by force of arms which it seized. In July and
August 1974, the Turkish army, using 45,000 men and hundreds of jet
airplanes, tanks, heavy artillery and napalm bombs, completed, and in
fact exceeded, its stated objective and established the notorious Attila
Line across Cyprus. The blatant act of aggression, unprecedented in the
United Nations era, and paralleled only by Saddam Hussein's invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, brought nearly forty percent of the territory of the
Republic under Turkish military occupation, including seventy percent of
its economic resources. The invasion forcibly uprooted some 200,000
Greek Cypriots from their ancestral homes, rendering many Cypriots
destitute refugees. It left several thousand dead and missing. It wreaked
havoc with the economy of Cyprus, which had been prospering until
then, and entailed massive violations of human rights by the Turkish
army.
The Turkish invasion marked the first time since the end of World
War II that a member of the Council of Europe and a signatory of the
Helsinki Final Act4, through the use of armed force, penetrated the bor-

4. EVGENY CHOSSUDOVSKY, UNITAR RESEARCH REPORT No. 24. THE HEasuN
FINAL ACr VIEWED IN THE UNITED NATIONS PERsPECLvE, TOWARDS STRENGTHENING
THE CONTINurry AND COHERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. U.N.

1226

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10: 4

ders of another European state, a member of the Council of Europe, an
associate member of the European Community and a cosignatory to the
Helsinki Final Act. Turkey's attempt to alter systematically the demographic character of the occupied part of the island by importing an
alien population from Turkey, expelling the remaining Greek Cypriots
from the occupied area, and destroying the cultural and religious heritage of the area under occupation tragically resulted in human suffering,
vast material destruction and gross violations of international and humanitarian law.
The current phase, from July 1974 to date, renders Cyprus a test-case
of unremedied aggression, continuing occupation, and a massive violation of human rights. Fundamental rules of international law, both customary and conventional, continue to be flouted with impunity, and the
United Nations resolutions continue to be ignored by the occupying
power.
The government of Cyprus has relied heavily upon international law
to pursue its cause of justice. Cyprus presented its position, couched in
terms of applicable rules of international law, in all available forums.
The United Nations General Assembly, in a landmark resolution, laid
down the framework and principles for a just and lasting solution to the
Cyprus problem, consistent with applicable rules of international law.The Resolution demanded the withdrawal of the foreign troops, the
return of the refugees, respect for the sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and called for an end to
all intervention and interference in its affairs. Although this unanimously
adopted Resolution, endorsed by the Security Council in its Resolution
365 (1974) has binding legal force under article 25 of the Charter, it remains unimplemented.
The key issue is whether the Turkish military invasion of July-August
1974 was justified legally under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Article 4 provides in pertinent part:
[i]n the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece,
Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of
those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove
possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take

Sales No. E.80.XV.RR/24 (1980).
5. In its landmark Resolution 3212 of 1974 as well as in many other resolutions and decisions.
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action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by
the present Treaty.
The clear answer is that this invasion, from which many other illegal
consequences flowed, was not justified legally, either in terms of Article
4 or in terms of the peremptory norm in Article 2(4) of the Charter.
First, the requirement of consultations under Article 4 was not met. Second, the term "action" could not be interpreted as meaning the use of
"armed force." Under the principle of construction tit res magis valeat
quam pereat, "action" should be interpreted as meaning peaceful action.
Third, the Turkish military action, despite some faint lip service at the
time, was not taken "with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty" but to impose by force Turkey's
prescription of a political solution inconsistent with the 1960 Treaty.
Even though the removal of the coupist regime and the assumption of
power by the constitutional acting President as early as July 23, 1974,
reestablished the constitutional order, the Turkish occupying forces remain in Cyprus more than twenty years later.
Under Article 2 (4) of the Charter, the prohibition against the threat
or use of force is absolute, and the two exceptions should be interpreted
narrowly. Professor Waldock cogently summarizes that:
The final result is that Article 2(4) prohibits entirely any threat or use of
force between independent states except in individual or collective selfdefence under Article 51 or in execution of collective measures under the
Charter for maintaining or restoring peace. Armed reprisals to obtain
satisfaction for an injury or armed intervention as an instrument of national policy otherwise than for self-defence is illegal under the Charter.
Hence, Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee did not and could not
authorize use of armed force by Turkey against Cyprus. Under the opposite interpretation, Article 4 would conflict with Article 2(4) under
Article 103 of the Charter and would be null and void under jus cogens,
as defined by the 1969 Vienna Convention. Despite the foregoing, Turkey did not act in accordance with its own interpretation of Article 4,
which clearly states that the sole aim of the action is for reestablishing
the state of affairs created by the Treaty of Guarantee.
Particular attention should be paid to the findings of the European
Commission of Human Rights which, after a quasi-judicial inquiry,

6. Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual
States in International Law, in HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 11
RECOumiL DES COURS

493

(1952).
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found Turkey, as the occupying power, responsible for the infractions in
the area of Cyprus under its occupation and found the Turkish army
guilty of serious violations of the Rome Convention.
The "declaration of independence" by the Turkish Cypriot leadership
and attempted secession of the part of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish
armed forces on November 15, 1983, drew immediate condemnation
throughout the world. This action, which could not have taken place
without Ankara's prior knowledge and approval-indeed Turkey is the
only country in the world to have recognized it as an "independent
state"-is in flagrant violation of the United Nations resolutions, international law, and more specifically the 1960 Nicosia Treaties, to which
Turkey is a signatory, which guarantee that the territory of Cyprus remain "one and indivisible," exclude "separatist independence," and prohibit "any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly ... partition of the Island."7 By promptly recognizing the secessionist entity,
Turkey violated its treaty obligations and confirmed its longstanding
partitionist designs for Cyprus.
The attempted secession yielded widespread international condemnation. The United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Community, the Commonwealth Conference, the United States, most other
states, and Greece and Britain, cosignatories of the 1960 Treaties, demanded reversal of this situation. Turkey is the only state to recognize
the secessionist entity. If any other state legally recognized the secessionist entity, this would raise legal issues against any state that purported to do so under the well established rules of international law on the
recognition of states and, in particular, the duty not to recognize situations brought about through the illegal use of force.
The United Nations Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind is of particular relevance to the Cyprus situation.8 In addition
to aggression and other crimes listed and defined under this Code, aspects of two other crimes were introduced at the insistence of Cyprus.
The first, under Article 21 of the Code, entitled "[s]ystematic or mass
violations of human rights," is the "deportation or forcible transfer of
population." The second, under Article 22 of the Code, entitled
"[e]xceptionally serious war crimes," is "the establishment of settlers in

7. Nicosia Treaties, Resolution 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960.
8. Comments and Observations of Governments on the Draft Code of the
Crimes Against Peace and Security of Mankind Adopted on First Reading by the
International Law Commission at its 43d Session, U.N. GAOR, Int'l L. Comm'n, 45th
Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/448/Add.1 (1993).
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an occupied territory and changes to the demographic composition of an
occupied territory." As the commentaries to these provisions make clear,
these are exceptionally serious crimes and individuals who commit or
order the commission of such violations are subject to prosecution and
conviction and the state itself may be responsible under the rules of
international law.
With regard to prospects for a solution to the Cyprus problem and
despite the existing deadlock, there exists both a framework for a solution and a procedure for pursuing efforts to this end. The framework is
provided for in the United Nations Resolutions. As for the procedure,
the good offices of the Secretary General and his personal involvement
provides a potentially helpful element. The Secretary General's efforts,
in turn, enjoy the support of most states, including the United States and
the other permanent members of the Security Council. The political will
for a just and lasting compromise solution, as demonstrated in deeds
over the years, undoubtedly exists on the part of the Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots. The basic difference is that, while the
Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots aim at reunification of the
country within a fair, reasonable and workable federal system, the Turkish side is systematically aiming at consolidation and legitimization of
the existing division. The Turkish objective must be overcome and Ankara must be persuaded that it is to its long term benefit to temper its
intransigence. If this can be achieved, a just and lasting solution is not
beyond reach, for there is much more that unites all Cypriots than the
differences that at present divide us. If this does not happen, regrettably,
the prospects ahead are for continued confrontation, increasing tension,
crisis, and even conflagration which may well spread beyond Cyprus.
Cyprus attaches great importance to the active support of the United
States in the efforts to reach a just and viable solution to the Cyprus
problem. The United States as a superpower and leader of the West, and
as a country with vital interests and influence in the region, is in a
unique position to assist. The United States Congress expressed its interest and support in a variety of ways and President Clinton has publicly
declared his interest "to work for an end to the tragic conflict in Cyprus, which is dividing too many people in too many ways."
Indeed, some of the many weighted statements offered in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait aptly apply to the Cyprus situation.

9. Notably Resolution 3212 endorsed by the Security Council in its Resolution
365 and reaffirmed by all subsequent resolutions including Resolution 939 of 29 July
1994.
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Following his warning to friend and foe alike that the acquisition of
territory by force is unacceptable and that aggression will not stand,
President Bush stated in his address to Congress in January 1991, that:
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future
generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the
law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at this new order, an order in
which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill
the promise and vision of the United Nations' founders."0
Distinct from the moral and geopolitical reasons for the United States
to exercise its influence toward implementation of the United Nations
resolutions on Cyprus, a legal case can also effectively be made. As a
founding member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the
Security Council, the United States is bound under Article 25 of the
Charter "to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter.""
Moreover, the legal aspect is also relevant to the United States in
terms of United States legislation, notably Section 620C of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and bilateral United States-Turkish agreements,
because of Turkey's illegal use of American arms supplied for an expressly different purpose in its invasion and continuing occupation of a
large part of Cyprus. This rule of law issue resulted in a congressionally
mandated arms embargo against Turkey in 1975. Cypriots welcome and
appreciate the Administration's repeatedly expressed support for the
Secretary General's efforts regarding a Cyprus settlement, as well as the
strengthening of the team dealing with the Cyprus problem through the
appointment of a Presidential Envoy.
The situation in Cyprus can be resolved permanently through the
application of international rules and principles. It is frustrating that
seemingly much more intractable problems such as that of the division
of Germany, apartheid in South Africa, and the conflict in the Middle
East, are resolved or on their way to a solution, while the situation in
Cyprus remains unresolved. It is consoling, however, that only a few
years ago no one could have guessed that Germany would be reunified
or that apartheid would be peacefully dismantled or that significant
progress would occur in the Middle East. Indeed who would have

10. President Bush Answers American People: We Will Not Fail, WASH. POST,
Jan. 17, 1991, at A29.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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guessed, a few short years ago, that the Soviet Union would no longer
exist and that democracy would be the norm in Eastern Europe?
In October 1990, I was fortunate enough to be present at the historic
ceremony in Berlin to mark German reunification. In September of
1993, I was on the White House South Lawn for the signing of the
Israeli-Palestinian joint declaration of principles and, in July 1994, I was
present at the Joint Session of Congress when King Hussein and Prime
Minister Rabin declared that the state of war no longer existed between
Jordan and Israel, which led to the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between them. I like to believe that one day in the not too distant future a
similarly auspicious event will take place marking the just solution to
the Cyprus problem. So, frustrating though it may be, we must persevere, stay the course, redouble our efforts in the conviction that our
cause is right and continue to believe that justice and the rule of law
will ultimately prevail.

DO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
BELONG IN A CONSTITUTION?
Herman Schwartz
When I first met Sy Rubin thirty years ago, he was already an established star. He is still a star, undimmed by time, sending out illumination and warmth. His step is slower, but not his wit or his wisdom.
But he's not always right. Even Homer nodded. Some years ago, he
wrote an article, which, among other things, raised doubts about establishing economic and social benefits as full-fledged rights. With characteristic insight and realism, he observed that:
when one discusses civil and political rights, one is generally talking
about restraints on governmental action, not prescriptions for such action ....

[]t is easier to tell governments that they shall not throw

persons in jail without a fair trial than they shall guarantee even a min[These] may be beyond their
imal but sufficient standard of living ....
capabilities, or may require major societal readjustments ... [that] involve conflicts within societies, as well as among nations.'
I think this and similar other criticisms are overdrawn, especially
where new constitutions are concerned, and I'd like to use this occasion
to explain why. Happily, Sy doesn't have a right of reply, so that he
will not be able to expose my flaws and fallacies, which he would
otherwise be very quick to do.2

* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Seymour L. Rubin, Economic and Social Rights and the New International
Economic Order, Address Before the American Society of International Law (on file
with the AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y) (emphasis in original).
2. A more thoroughgoing critique of the constitutionalization of economic and
social rights appears in Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights Don't Belong in the Constitutions of Post-Communist EuropeE. EUtR
CONsT. REV. 35, 35-38, Winter 1993. My responses to these arguments appear in

Herman Schwartz, Economic & Social Rights, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y. 551
(1993) and In Defense of Aiming High: Why Economic and Social Rights Belong in

the Post-Communist Constitutions of Europe, E. Eut.
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Whether economic and social rights should be included in the new
European constitutions is one of the most controversial issues in current
constitutional theorizing. In practice, it is a non-issue because all of the
constitutions already adopted by these nations contain a relatively full
complement of such rights, though in a variety of formulations. 3 Those
nations which have not yet adopted new constitutions, such as Poland,
Georgia and Ukraine, plan also to include such rights, in one form or
another.4 And insofar as the parties that are successors to the former
Communist parties regain powerful positions in their respective governments-which seems to be happening almost everywhere in the former
Soviet bloc-the likelihood that such provisions will be adopted increases.' Nevertheless, in parts of the world, including some countries of the
former Soviet bloc, where constitutions are being either revised or written anew, the issue is still a live one.6
For purposes of discussion, the competing arguments can roughly be
divided into what might loosely be called practical and philosophical.
The former focuses on whether economic and social rights are judicially
enforceable, the latter on whether placing economic and social rights in
a constitution is consistent in principle with the establishment of a free,

3. The different formulations have been described in a recent unpublished paper
by Professor Francoise Dreyfus, presented on March 11, 1995 at a conference in
Krakow, Poland (on file with author).
4. Even established nations like Finland and Germany, which are revising their
constitutions, are considering adopting such provisions. A conservative government in
Finland, during a very severe economic recession, has already started the process and
will probably complete it in September 1995. For a discussion of the effort, see
Krzysztof Drzewicki & Allan Rosas, Social Rights in a United Europe, in SocIAL
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE I1, 19-20 (Krzysztof Drzewicki
et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Drzewicki, Krause & Rosas]. In Germany, the issue has
become a very contentious one between East and West, and it is unlikely that any
new constitution will be adopted. The current German Basic Law has very few such
provisions.
5. Hungary is considering revising its current constitution which consists of its
Communist constitution but with so many amendments that almost nothing is left of
the original instrument. The victory of the post-Communist party led by Gyula Horn
would seem to ensure that if the constitution is revised, the currently existing ESR
will not be substantially weakened.
6. See Sunstein, supra note 2; Wictor Osiatynski, Rights in New Constitutions of
East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. H.R. L. REV., 111, 138-45 (1994); Nicholas
Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S.
AFR. J. H.R. 451 (1992); D.M. Davis, The Case Against the Inclusion of
Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except As Directive Principles, 8 S.
AFR. J. H.R. 475 (1992).
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democratic, market-oriented civil society. Put another way, the first
question turns on a supposed dichotomy between positive and negative
rights, the second on the kind of society that is most desirable.
To most American lawyers, putting economic and social rights in a
constitution verges on the unthinkable Americans are taught to think
that constitutional rights depend on judicial enforceability almost by
definition. No matter that, in practice, courts refrained from enforcing
these rights for most of the first 150 years of our existence! Formally,
the courts were available as an appropriate forum. In a nation that relies
on legal resolution of disputed issues more than any other, including the
protection of rights, the presumed inappropriateness of a conventional
judicial resolution seems to imply as a matter of linguistic logic that the
concept of "right" may not be used for something that does not lend itself readily to such resolution.
There is also the related belief, reflected in Sy's comments, that
courts can effectively enforce only negative rights, only those rights that
deny power. Our Bill of Rights seems to contain only such denials.
Although there is no shortage of demands on government for everything
from tariff protection to outright subsidies and social protection, these
are not considered a matter of right. To the contrary, the national ethos
has always been anti-government and negative, especially where social
rights are concerned, as we are seeing today. Today, no serious person
would suggest establishing economic and social rights as a matter of
American constitutional law?
Before turning to these questions, a preliminary clearing away is
necessary. The central issue is not really about social and economic
rights, but primarily about social rights. More precisely, it is about social and certain economic rights. There seems to be no controversy,

7. American academic thinkers have argued that such rights could be drawn
from the American Constitution. See Frank I. Michelman. The Supreme Court's 1968
Term-Forward? On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969); see also Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGs LJ. 1 (1987). These theories seem to have had no practical effect.
8. The first case in which Frst Amendment free speech provisions enforced the
Amendment by striking down a state-created restriction was Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931). See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 50 U. Cmi. L. REv. 1205 (1983).
9. This is one reason why the chances that the United States will ratify the
International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights any time in the
foreseeable future seem virtually nil to this observer.
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certainly on the part of opponents of constitutionalizing such rights,
about the appropriateness of protecting property and other forms of
private economic activity against governmental action. This is justified
(or perhaps rationalized) on the ground that this involves only a negative right; that is, preventing the state from interfering with property.
That, of course, overlooks the vast panoply of protections that property
owners expect the state to provide-police, courts, a legal structure-in
order to give substance to property rights."
Insofar as the issue is put in terms of the contrast between positive
and negative rights, it should first be noted that many of the social
rights involved are themselves negative rights. The rights under discussion, as set out for example in the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, include the right to work as variously
defined; the right to just and favorable conditions of work; the right to
form trade unions and to strike; the right to social security, adequate
food, clothing, housing, education, health and health care; and the right
to special protection for mothers and children. Some of these, such as
the right to form unions, are just variations of the right to associate, a
traditional negative right. Similarly, the right to strike includes a right to
be free from interference with strikes, also a negative right. Even so
"outlandish" a right as the right to a clean environment, a so-called
"third generation" right, will often call for stopping governments and
others from polluting the atmosphere or the home, something that is not
too different from traditional public nuisance litigation.
Moreover, some social rights that require courts to order affirmative
remedial measures involve only traditional judicial functions. The right
to safe working conditions is a good example. Courts enforce this right
all the time in statutory, common law, and even constitutional cases.
Thus, prisoner litigation in the 1970s frequently challenged unsafe and
unhealthy conditions in prison workshops under so vague a rubric as the
Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, with a good
deal of success.
A related aspect of the negativity of many of these social rights is
their close relationship to other rights that are indisputably negative. The
most significant of these is the right to be free from discrimination.
Most countries already have statutes which create rights to public health
care, education, maternity benefits, housing, social security, and other

10. See Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Abstention or Involvement? The Nature of State
Obligations Under Different Categories of Rights, in Drzewicki, Krause & Rosas,
supra note 4, 52-60 (arguing that negative rights necessarily entail personal rights).
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social benefits. In the enforcement of such statutory rights, the right of
putative recipients to be free from discrimination has been invoked
routinely."
Discrimination is obviously not the only possible abuse. Established

social programs may be administered in other unfair ways implicating
other recognized "negative" rights. Benefits can and are denied to people
because of their outspokenness, parentage, or class status. The same

goes for interference with the right to work, and can come up in the
context of hiring, discharge, or unfair working conditions."

The courts' role in issuing orders commanding specific positive actions and not just prohibitions, discussed earlier, raises a larger consider-

ation. As Professor Abram Chayes pointed out over twenty years ago,
courts today are far beyond the narrow roles they used to play." The
modem court engages in a wide variety of affirmative activities, ranging

from the supervision of school desegregation, prisons, and nursing
homes, to the monitoring of corrupt unions. Courts have always supervised the administration of estates, bankruptcies, and receiverships. In all
these cases, courts are doing much more than merely saying no-they
are actually setting standards and in many cases requiring the expenditure of public money.' 4
It is this latter point-court-ordered expenditures of public mon-

ey-that raises the problems to which the criticism of constitutionalizing
rights is primarily addressed. Suppose there is no health care or housing

or education system. By what authority does a court tell a legislature
that it must create a health care or education system, a welfare program,

11. See Martin Sheinin, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 41, 44-45 (Asbiom
Eide et. al., eds.).
12. See Miroslaw \Vyryzkowski, Social Rights in the Jurisprudence of the Commissionerfor Citizens' Rights in Poland, in Drzewicki, Krause and Rosas, supra note
4, at 267-69.
13. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281 (1976); Morton J. Horwitz, Forward: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 30 (1993).
14. An anecdote from my own experience may illustrate the point. Years ago, I
sued a prison administrator because he would not allow the prisoners to make telephone calls on Sunday. I knew the administrator well, and I asked him, "Why not
allow them to make telephone calls on a Sunday?" He replied, "Every time a prisoner goes to a telephone, a guard must accompany him, and that costs money I can't
afford. If you sue me, you will probably win. The court will then order it, and the
legislature will feel compelled to comply with the court's order and give me a bigger
budget."

1238

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10: 4

or some other kind of benefit system? This certainly raises issues relating to budgetary priorities, separation of powers, judicial authority, and
competence. As Sy suggests, these issues will induce conflicts within
societies, for they involve reordering fundamental priorities. How can
courts reorder the priorities established by a democratically elected legislature and executive? And suppose there is little or no money so that
the programs cannot be established? Won't there be disillusionment with
democracy if such rights are not implemented?
As noted, this problem is usually more theoretical than real. Almost
all modem nations already have governmental health care, education,
social security, and similar programs. Where established programs exist,
the usual problems revolve around the discriminatory or arbitrary administration of these programs, as previously discussed. Courts have been
dealing with such problems in Europe and the United States for a long
time.
Where such programs do not exist, these rights may not be quite so
judicially unenforceable. To some extent, it is a matter of separation of
powers. Americans wince at the thought that a court may order a legislature to pass legislation or spend money, despite Supreme Court cases
5
like the Prince Edward County and Missouri v. Jenkins decisions,
which come close to doing precisely that. Much that courts do, including American courts, requires the expenditure of substantial funds on
pain of contempt or some other unacceptable consequence.
Moreover, many European constitutional courts do not seem at all
reluctant to tell legislatures that they must adopt specific legislation. The
Hungarian Court recently told the Parliament that it must pass legislation
protecting minorities. This is not unusual in Europe and is often constitutionally authorized, though foreign to Americans.
The legislature may, of course, refuse to follow the court's direction.
Will this not weaken a court and indeed the rule of law itself, perhaps
irreparably? Perhaps, but it is not likely. Courts throughout the world
are defied, but this rarely impairs their prestige, so long as such defi-

15. Griffin v. Prince Edward Co. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that
the Prince Edward County's closing of public schools, while financially contributing to
private, segregated, white schools, violated African-American children's right to equal
protection); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (dealing with the school district's
financial obligations for the desegregation of the school system). In cases involving
prisons, mental institutions, nursing homes, etc., court orders barring unconstitutional
living conditions such as overcrowding have often forced the expenditure of large
sums on pain of the institutions being closed. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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ance is isolated and not routine. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, for

example, ordered the adoption of legislation on television. Although
legislation is still not enacted, the Hungarian court remains one of the
strongest in the world. In March 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court
told the Republic of Tatarstan that it could not hold a referendum on
Tatar independence. Tatarstan ignored the Court's order. Nevertheless,

and despite numerous controversial decisions, that Court went on to
become one of the most respected institutions in Russia until mid-1993,

when it involved itself too deeply in the political struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament. Courts are simply not
such fragile institutions, despite the ritual warnings to that effect.

Nor is it likely that nonenforcement of social rights will depreciate
the currency of all rights, or of the rule of law itself, even though this

is often asserted. 6 There is simply no evidence that the denial or
nonenforceability of some rights prejudices the enforcement of others,
whether in the United States or elsewhere.

Nor does it necessarily follow that the presence of rights in a constitution requires that they be judicially enforceable for them to be meaningful. For one thing, there is political enforceability, which judges who
claim to espouse judicial restraint routinely invoke."7 Putting rights into

a constitution, even if not judicially enforceable, is not an idle gesture.
Something that is considered a conditionally mandated legislative obliga-

tion is likely to have a lot more clout in the political debate over bud-

16. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2.
17. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266
(1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
292 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 1336-37, (2d ed. 1988):
These observations imply that the affirmative governmental duty to meet
basic human needs cannot always be enforced directly . . . if the state and
federal governments were to wash their hands altogether of the sick, hungry
and poor, none of the interstitial doctrines sketched here could provide a
remedy. But that is simply a reminder of the basic point suggested as long
ago as 1827 by Chief Justice Marshall-that a government which wholly
failed to discharge its duty to protect its citizens would be answerable primarily in the streets and at the polling booth, and only secondarily, if at all,
in the courts. To say this is not to deny that government has affirmative
duties to its citizens arising out of the basic necessities of bodily survival,
but only to deny that all such duties are perfectly enforceable in the courts
of law.
Tribe, supra, at 1336-37.
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geting priorities than something that is completely discretionary with the
legislature. The American health care debate might be very different if
health care were considered a matter of constitutional right. Moreover,
even if a court cannot or should not order the legislature to do anything,
merely announcing the obligation can be important by establishing the
fact and nature of the legislative obligation. It is then up to the legislature to balance its various obligations, constitutional and otherwise.
People also realize that some rights are conditional on the existence
of financial and other resources, and cannot be implemented if the resources are inadequate. 8 Disillusionment with democracy is unlikely if
constitutionally mandated benefits are not provided simply because of a
lack of money.
These considerations also seem applicable to what are called "third
generation rights," such as the right to a healthy environment. The difference, of course, is that a national government cannot wholly control
its environment. But a state can take measures to help. And perhaps
these latter rights mean nothing more than that, for it must not be forgotten that most people are not fanatisists. They live in the same world
we do. They know no nation can, by itself, create a "healthy" environment to fulfill the right completely. Articulating a right to a healthy
environment is simply a way of imposing political and moral obligations
on those who operate the state's governmental apparatus to avoid steps
that damage the environment and to improve it, because that is a basic
priority of the people. By making a healthy environment a constitutional
right, the likelihood is increased that those who control and manage
state power will be punished politically if the environment is damaged
or not improved.
One final point: Positive rights are not unknown to American constitutional law. Almost all state constitutions provide for a right to an
education, and some states recognize constitutional rights to welfare,
housing, health, and abortions. 9 For example, some twelve state constitutions set forth a state constitutional obligation to care for the sick and
needy. Although some state courts virtually ignore such provisions, New
York's highest court ruled that the New York State Constitution Article
XVII, § 1 which provides that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy

18. See Kopp, The Right to An Adequate Standard of Living: Justice, Autonomy,
and Basic Needs, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS 231, 243-47 (Ellen F. Paul et. al., eds. 1992).
19. See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International
Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44 HAST. L.J. 79, 97-98
(1992).
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are public concerns and shall be provided by the State and by such of
its subdivisions and in such manner and by such means as the legislature may from time to time determine," requires that the legislature not
deny aid to needy individuals on the basis of criteria unrelated to
need." This is a case where the issue might have been treated as a
discrimination matter, but as noted, in the modem welfare state, that
holds for many economic and social issues.
Even the United States Constitution implies some positive obligations.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery covers private action,
and though the Supreme Court has invoked it only to strike down state
legislation,2' this would seem to impose an obligation on the federal
government to protect people against private violations of this right. The
Seventh Amendment requires the federal government to provide jury
trials in civil and federal cases even though, unlike criminal cases, the
state is not directly involved. And in the criminal context, the Supreme
Court has required the state to provide counsel,' trial transcripts and
other aids to defendants.'
Indeed, it can be said that an organized society always makes a claim
on government to create institutions and programs "to provide for the
common defense [and] promote the general welfare." The fact that these
latter are not conventional social rights is unimportant. We demand that
the government provide certain things, and to that end obligate it to
create certain programs, because we believe that as citizens we are entifled to them.
Nor does this mean that courts will second-guess the adequacy of
governmental programs where such rights are concerned. American
courts are fully aware of their limitations in this regard, and one can
presume that foreign courts are aware of their limitations as well. In
most cases, they are likely to exercise very little supervision over the
details of such programs, so long as basic rights to non-discrimination
and the like are honored. 4 For example, in a case involving rent reductions in Austria, the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislature has a

20. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977).
21. See Tribe, supra note 17, at 1688 n.1.
22. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent
defendant in state criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed to

him).
23. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that indigent defendants

have the right to be finnished with trial records and transcripts, without cost, for
appellate purposes).
24. Zlinsky, J., unpublished address at Krakow (on file with the author).
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"wide margin of appreciation" where economic and social policies are
concerned. 5
Nevertheless, the question remains: why should these rights be included in a constitution? As a matter of constitutional principle should the
State be obligated to provide such benefits? American lawyers are used
to thinking that the quality of a constitution is directly proportionate to
its brevity. Occam's Razor is usually a good working principle.
To respond to these considerations it is useful to consider the nature
of a constitution. Although it is indeed a legal document, a constitution
is much more than that. It is the foundation charter of the political society, which draws on the experience of the past and the hopes for the future to create a set of mechanisms and values that are beyond the power
of ordinary legislative majorities to change. The American Constitution
is of course a paradigm of that latter point: we have had very few constitutional amendments during our more than two hundred year history.
Obviously, constitutions include the mechanisms for the distribution of
power, which are the most controversial, everywhere and at almost
every time, whether in Philadelphia in 1787 or Poland today. Rendered
equally immune to transient legislative majorities are the fundamental
values of the society. In the United States, we have long accepted the
fundamental nature of the basic civil and political rights, and that is
certainly true in most western societies. But-and this may come as a
surprise to most Americans-almost all societies save our own also
recognize the prime importance of economic and social rights. Far from
such rights being newly sprung from the paternalistic soil of Communism,' these rights go back at least to Franklin D. Roosevelt's Four
Freedoms, and appear in constitutions as conservative as the French
Gaullist constitution of 1958, which explicitly incorporated the Preamble
to the 1946 Constitution with its economic and social guarantees, as
well as in Italy, Spain, Japan and virtually everywhere elseY Throughout the world, it is now recognized, in Justice Holmes' aphorism, that
"a necessitous man is not a free man," which Sy quoted at the head of
his article. Economic and social rights are inextricably intertwined with

25. Sheinin, supra note 11, at 51.
26. See Sunstein, supra note 2.
27. The universal acknowledgement of the primacy of these rights is reflected in
Articles 22-27 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
overwhelmingly in 1948-interestingly enough, except, by the Communist States-but
supported by the United States, as well as in numerous other international agreements
and declarations.
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civil and political rights. In part, this is because genuine representative
democracy involves widespread participation, as well as tolerance and
compromise. Destitute, hungry people don't vote, and idle, hungry people have no patience for the slow, often tedious haggling among often
sharply differing groups that democracy requires.
It has also been suggested that putting positive rights into a constitution will encourage the sense of entitlement and discourage individual
initiative; but such psychological speculation is both unproven and implausible. It is hard to believe that the current move toward a
free-market economy will be affected in any way by the inclusion of
positive rights in a constitution. The existence of Czechoslovakia's Charter on Human Rights and Freedoms has not weakened that government's
Thatcherite policies in the slightest. In fact, the right-wing Czech government of Vaclav Klaus has offered to leave the economic and social
rights of the former federal charter intact, in part as a bargaining tool
with the opposition, and in part out of fear of a negative international
reaction. Individual initiative is flourishing even in the former Soviet
Union. And if people are asserting an excessively heightened sense of
entitlement, insisting that, for example, they are entitled to job security
in all circumstances, this may be because they are suffering great hardship merely trying to acquire such basics as food and shelter.
Finally, it has also been argued that positive rights establish governmental interference with markets as a constitutional duty." But clearly
the mere presence of such rights in the Czechoslovak or Hungarian constitutions has not interfered with the Czechoslovak or Hungarian free
market reforms; nor is their presence in the Russian or Polish constitutions a significant factor in Russia's or Poland's policies and problems.
It must therefore be the implementation of constitutional duties that is
held to constitute an interference.
This is not really an argument against putting these rights into the
constitutions, but against having them anywhere, for there is no reason
to think that it is the constitutionalization of these rights that is crucial.
Regardless of whether the programs implementing such rights are put in
place by a statute adopted by a politically created majority or by some
governmental action fulfilling a constitutional duty, the governmental
interference with the market economy is the same. The fact that the
interference results from an entrenched constitutional mandate rather than

28. See Cass Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism 17 (Chicago Law and
Economics Working Paper, No. 3 (1991)).
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from the enactments of a possible transient majority does not affect the
fact and degree of interference.29
In closing, I should note that I am not sure that Sy is really opposed
to such considerations. At the close of the essay to which I have already
referred, he comments with respect to international instruments which
provide for such rights,
[T]here is a valuable role to be played by a formulation of general and
rather sweeping standards, despite their being generally ignored. Such
standards influence conduct and often lead to specific and workable rules.
Indeed, the rules may well not be internationally mandated for them to be
effective. The more useful course is their adoption by national
rule-making authorities.30
To which I would add my hearty assent.

29. But see Sunstein, supra note 2.
30. Seymour L. Rubin, Economic and Social Rights and the New International
Economic Order, Address Before the American Society of International Law (on file
with the AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).

SEYMOUR J. RUBIN-SOME OF THE ORIGINS
Bennett Boskey"

It is a special pleasure for me to participate in this publication to
celebrate the achievements of Seymour J. Rubin. Sy Rubin and I have a
long acquaintance and close friendship, dating all the way back to our
time together at the Harvard Law School; he was in the Class of 1938,
and I, the Class of 1939.
Sy came to Harvard with an undergraduate degree from the University
of Michigan where he entered as a young man from the midwest sanctum of Chicago. At Michigan, he had compiled an excellent academic
record, and rendered a meritorious performance as a member of the
University's wrestling team. Wrestling is not for everyone; it calls for a
rather specialized combination of fortitude, determination, strength, agility, and skill-qualities which the short but wiry youthful Sy had in
abundance. At Harvard Law School, he "made" the Harvard Law Review at the end of his first year and served on Volumes 50 and 51.
There our paths began to cross with frequency; I served on Volume 51,
and I served as the Book Review Editor of Volume 52.
Sy stayed on to do a year of graduate work at the Law School, after
some prompting from Professor Felix Frankfurter to whom Sy's exceptional facility in writing and in dialogue had become evident. Professor
Frankfurter was then the sole arbiter in the annual selection of a law
clerk for each of the two Judges Hand on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Professor Frankfurter sent Sy to Judge
Augustus N. Hand, known familiarly as "Gus," and sent me to Judge
Learned Hand, known familiarly (though at the time I was not yet
aware of it) as "B"-"B" being a surviving remnant of his original first
name, "Billings," which he had put into discard. This was to be the last
occasion on which Professor Frankfurter exercised this important function since during the academic year he was nominated and confirmed as
a Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States.'
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Member of the Council and Trea-

surer, The American Law Institute.
1. Felix Frankfurter was nominated on January 5, 1939. On the afternoon of
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Sy and I began our new assignments in the Second Circuit at the end
of Summer 1939. An initial objective was to meet our respective Judges
Hand for the first time; their practice had been to engage Professor
Frankfurter's selectee sight unseen-a display of confidence that not
many federal judges today would care to emulate. The real duties of the
law clerks would be explained-in a very minimal fashion, Sy and I
each found out-by the outgoing law clerk who by that date had little
time to spare for such a briefing since he was in an undisguised hurry
to depart.
A few words should be said concerning the Second Circuit's structure,
particularly since it was so different from what one would see today.
The court had a total of six circuit judges in contrast to today's thirteen
active circuit judges and eight senior circuit judges. The six were Judge
Learned Hand, whose seniority made him what then was called "the
Senior Circuit Judge" and imposed on him a mild version of the kind of
administrative responsibilities now lodged in what came to be called
"the Chief Judge" of the circuit; Judge Thomas W. Swan, a former
Dean of the Yale Law School; Judge Augustus N. Hand, who was
Learned Hand's cousin and lifelong close friend and confidant; Judge
Harrie B. Chase, a canny Vermonter by origin and instinct; Judge
Charles E. Clark, who also but more recently had been the Dean of the
Yale Law School and had been a moving spirit in the formulation and
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and Judge Robert P.
Patterson, formerly a New York lawyer who had been awarded the
Congressional Medal of Honor for valor during World War I and who
in July 1940 resigned from the court to accept appointment as Assistant
Secretary of War.
As is still the case, the court normally sat in panels of three in the
Federal Courthouse at Foley Square, located in the lower part of Manhattan in New York City-near Chinatown and in good proximity to

President Roosevelt's White House announcement, a few of us from the Law Review
went to the Frankfurter residence to express our pleasure and offer our good wishes.
We found Mr. and Mrs. Frankfurter having tea with Professor Alfred North Whitehead and Mrs. Whitehead. The confirmation hearing was much publicized but happily
relatively short, and again, a few of us from the Law Review escorted Professor
Frankfurter to the train station in Boston the night before he was scheduled to testify
at the hearing in Washington. "Curiously, for one so frequently in the storm center of
controversy, only a few cranks opposed the nomination. The Senate unanimously confirmed it." Resolutions of the Bar, read at the Supreme Court Proceedings in Memory
of Honorable Felix Frankfurter, Oct. 25, 1965, 382 U.S. xix, xxvi (1965). He took his
seat on January 30, 1939.
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what we came to discover were more than passable Chinese, and other,
restaurants. Unless court sessions compelled his presence in New York
City, Judge Chase usually stayed and worked at his chambers in
Brattleboro, Vermont; and Judge Clark often, though not quite so regularly, stayed and worked at his chambers in New Haven, Connecticut.
Each judge had one-repeat one-law clerk. This contrasts sharply
with the situation today in which three law clerks are the entitlement of
an active circuit judge, in addition to the smaller number assigned today
to a senior circuit judge, plus some additional law clerks who are
deemed to be working for the court as a whole. In other words, at the
present time the Second Circuit has well over forty law clerks, as opposed to what Sy and I found to be our six. This is not to suggest that
with the passage of time an undue proliferation of law clerks has necessarily occurred; at least a good part of the change is accounted for by
the undue proliferation of the cases on the docket, which nobody seems
able to control in this litigious nation of ours. But the change over the
past five decades does inevitably diminish the collegiality of the group.
Thus, of our six law clerks the man who served Judge Chase worked
exclusively (or at least almost exclusively) in Brattleboro. I cannot recall
ever meeting him and I understand that neither can Sy. That left us with
only five, for the purpose of any discussions we might wish to have
among ourselves-and these were numerous, in which Sy was a vigorous participant. In addition to Sy and myself, was a classmate of mine,
John W. O'Boyle, who was Judge Patterson's clerk; as might be expected, there was a Yale Law School graduate, Harold Steinberg, who
served as Judge Swan's clerk; and Judge Clark's clerk, Lloyd N. Cutler,
who had been editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal and lately has
been much in the news as President Clinton's temporary White House
counsel. Learned Hand enjoyed referring to our group as the "puisne
judges," which was flattery beyond what we deserved, and of course
each of us found that the relationship with his own judge was somewhat
different from the others. But it was a cozy court, abounding in friendliness,2 and the judges-especially the two Hands-were willing, and

2. The two Hands would sometimes tease Judge Clark about the Rules of Civil

Procedure, which they felt Judge Clark counted on too much to provide salvation for
the federal courts. Notwithstanding this, and being too early for the irritation with
Judge Clark later felt by some of his brethren (as reported by Gunther, infra, pp.
517-524), there was a pleasing congeniality of all six judges, following the resignation

of Senior Circuit Judge Martin T. Manton, effective February 7, 1939 (which made
Learned Hand the Senior Circuit Judge) and the appointment of Judge Patterson to
fill the resulting vacancy. Manton resigned because he was about to be indicted on a
variety of bribery charges. He was subsequently convicted and took an appeal to the
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even seemed pleased, to engage in lively discourse which often included
law clerks other than their own.
The court's operations are well described in Gerald Gunther's recent
magnificent biography of Learned Hand.3 The opinions of the court for
this particular year-the October Term of 1939-are scattered throughout the volumes 107 F.2d to 114 F.2d. They cover an astonishing variety of subjects-not many of them being of constitutional dimensions.
It seems that a look at the opinions of Augustus N. Hand for that
year will foretell much about the Sy Rubin who developed in later

Second Circuit, where the conviction was affirmed by a specially-designated panel
consisting of retired Justice Sutherland, Justice Stone and Judge Clark. United States
v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940); see G.
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 503-13 (1994). Manton's appeal to the Second Circuit was argued during October Term 1939, and I well remember the indignation of the two Hands when they learned that Manton, in going to the
courtroom to listen to the oral argument, had seen fit to make use of the judges'
"private" elevator. Ultimately, Manton spent seventeen months in the federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
3. See GUNTHER, supra note 2, at ch. VII, ch. XII (respectively itled The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1920s and 1930s: Hand as First Among Equals
and The Chief Judgeship and World War I1). Judge Clark subsequently expressed his
own feelings as follows:
In fact, my deepest recollection of my years of service with these two distinguished men [Judges Hand and Hand] is of the pure fun involved. Each had a
marvelous sense of humor, and to each the foibles and inconsistencies of mankind always made a deep appeal. To say that it was a stimulus to work with
them is a vast understatement.
C. E. Clark, Augustus Noble Hand, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1113 (1955).
As stated by Wilfred Feinberg, a later Chief Judge of the Second Circuit:
The court was "small," supporting personnel (which would include us law
clerks) were "few," the judges "worked hard and steadily" but "in a comparatively unhurried atmosphere" and "were uncluttered by the trappings of modernity." As to opinion-writing, "[N]o one felt obliged to write compendious
opinions in routine cases, but there was an opinion in almost every case that
had been briefed and argued."
WILFRED FEINBERG, THE REMARKABLE HANDS: AN AFFECTIONATE PORTRAIT at

(1983). Judge Feinberg summed it up:
If Learned Hand and his brethren were alive today, what would they think?
. . . My guess is that they would be shocked by how different the life of a
Second Circuit judge is today. They would, I think, be amazed by three major
trends: the overwhelming increase in the use of the federal judicial system, the
diminution of judicial time available for case-related activity and the increased
manifestation of discontent with government and, indeed, with all public institutions, including the judiciary.
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years. It is not that Sy ever really wrote the opinions of Gus Hand; to
the best of my knowledge Gus never had a law clerk who could properly make such an assertion about his own role. But for the most part
Sy and Gus were in harmony as to the outcome of the cases, and had
been more than casually instructive to each other as the opinions developed.
The year was one which came during the rather extensive period
when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was widely regarded
as the leading court in the country on matters of commercial and business law. The eminence of its judges and the manifest care with which
their opinions were crafted lent extra authoritativeness to their pronouncements on such subjects.
As one looks over Gus Hand's opinions for the October Term of
1939 one must be impressed by the wide range of the areas covered, by
the meticulous attention to detail in measuring lawyer's advocacy against
statute and precedent, and by what (in contrast to today's far more
spacious standards) would appear to be a strong deliberate drive toward
succinctness of expression. Gus Hand, with the help of Sy Rubin, had
the opportunity to write in cases which involved a number of the federal
specialties. These specialties included the admiralty jurisdiction (where
international uniformity has long been a principal, though not always
overriding, objective), the patent jurisdiction, and the bankruptcy jurisdiction. Some of these cases had at least peripheral transnational implications which might bring them into a zone of familiarity with other
contents of this festschrift. For example, there was an opinion in a patent case in which one of the issues was the significance of certain foreign patents as prior art which might invalidate the United States patent
in suit.4 Another example was of a collision in New York Harbor
where a vessel was found to be contributorily negligent because its
master, fascinated with observing the movements of a nearby Russian
vessel, had been inattentive to what was straight ahead of him.5 A third
example was that of a French co-partnership which was suing to recover
damages for breach of a contract entered into in London. In this case, a

4. Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 107 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 621 (1939) (this is a customary way to seek to undermine a United
States patent).
5. The William C. Atwater, 110 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1940); see also The
Sagnache, 112 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1940) (involving a seaman's claims for maintenance
and care and for negligence, arising out of events on the high seas and in foreign

ports).
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Finnish vessel was chartered for certain international voyages and the
scope of an arbitration clause was in dispute.6
Similarly, Gus' portfolio of opinions for the Term included a significant number in the federal tax field. Although the Internal Revenue
Code of today has become frustratingly complex to some, reviewing
these 1939 Term opinions will show that it was ever thus, though probably to a lesser degree. "[In tax matters, however, precision is important, and so is clarity."7 What shines through these tax opinions which
must be attributed partly to Sy Rubin as well as primarily to Gus Hand
is the clarity and the success of the methodology. The Internal Revenue
Code and the facts are examined side by side. The surrounding precedents receive due respect. All plausible arguments advanced by the parties are dealt with, and a conclusion is stated with admirable brevity.
What more does all this tell us about Sy Rubin?
First and foremost, his year with Gus Hand demonstrates that when a
talented young law school graduate has the good luck to serve as law
clerk to an experienced and talented judge, the benefit for the law clerk
can be enormous. In Sy's instance, the year helped to foster in him the
orderliness and wisdom that have been reflected in his later extensive
writings and oral presentations.
Second, such service in a court where the relationships among the
judges were not only cordial but highly congenial, and where a spirit of
accommodation prevailed, helped to foster the skills of diplomacy which
have been so characteristic of Sy. He displayed these skills in the notable public service he has rendered and in the series of important posts
which he later came to occupy with unfailing distinction.
Finally, the sheer variety of the work in the Second Circuit during
October Term of 1939 helped to foster Sy's exceptional ability to deal
with new situations as they arose, such a welcome hallmark of Sy's entire professional career.

6. The Wilja, 113 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 687 (1940).
7. Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackinun, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1994).

SOME SECOND THOUGHTS
William Diebold'

When I heard there was to be a Festschrift for my old friend Sy
Rubin, I was delighted. I looked forward to reading it. But when I was
asked to write something for it, I was taken aback. What could I say?
There was no time for original research. I am not one who has unpublished manuscripts around the house that can be put into shape for any
occasion. Others could examine Sy's many diverse activities more authoritatively than I, an economist among lawyers; many had worked
more closely with him than I. But I did not want to be left out.
Seymour Rubin and I have lived through the same period and much
of the time we were paying attention to the same facets of it. As I
thought about these matters I realized that in a way I was providing the
answer to the question, What to write? Although we were only occasionally involved in the same enterprise, we had often been thinking
about the same problems and observing the same events. It seemed
natural to ask, What do we think now about what we thought then?
Second thoughts would be my subject. But then an awkward second
thought intruded: I do not really know what Sy thought about all the
issues that came up, much less what he thinks today; so there will have
to be some fudging. Worse, most of the time there is no escaping the
fact that I shall be talking mostly about my own views. It will be as if
my maxim were sum, ergo cogito-or whatever the right tenses should
be. Perhaps I can sometimes hide behind a general view of what the informed opinion was at the time.
That settled, I faced another question: What issues to write about? It
did not seem promising to try to take in the whole world economy for
fifty years and more. So I have settled arbitrarily on three topics that
have been of concern to both Sy Rubin and to me: the creation of what
I call the Bretton Woods world (which means more than the agreements
reached in that New Hampshire resort in 1944); the system for promoting liberal trade that has been part of that world and which has given
* Senior Fellow Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations.
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us both satisfaction and trouble, successes and failures, for quite a long
time; and finally, Sy's experience as a prod to what he called "the conscience of the rich nations." As these are not small subjects, additional
arbitrary slicing is called for, as will be apparent in what follows.
By definition second thoughts cannot be altogether original. Sometimes their main interest lies in seeing how today's view differs from
that of the past. But "second thoughts" does not mean "second guessing," although some of the second thoughts may be prompted by the
efforts of others to second guess what was done in the past and tell us
what ought to have been done. Even if the second thoughts are no
different from what we said in the past, they may be worth voicing.
After all, the same statement has a different meaning when it is said in
different circumstances. And to say something twice is not the same as
saying it once. As Saburo Okita, the Japanese economist who became
Foreign Minister, said, "[o]ld wisdom may be only stupidity under different circumstances."'
The Bretton Woods World
The creation of the Bretton Woods world was the basis for understanding everything that followed in the international economy. Other
developments were essential, such as the Marshall Plan, Western European integration, the modernization of Japan, decolonization, and even
the Cold War in its way. But they were all approached within the
framework of the complex multilateral agreements to promote cooperation that made up the Bretton Woods system along with the intergovernmental institutions embedded in those agreements. The Bretton Woods
world was not created by governments alone; its makers included many
private citizens who, during the war and after, studied the problems that
had to be faced. They set forth arguments, made recommendations, and
above all created a climate that supported the taking of major, unprecedented steps to create a new world order. Within governments, it was
not only the highest-placed officials and political leaders who counted,
but also all levels of civil servants, some permanent and some temporary, who not only produced ideas, but also drafted the rules, the constitutions, and the agreements that were needed to implement these ideas.
As they worked, these creators of the Bretton Woods world had to
think every day about three questions: What to do? How to do it so that
it was acceptable to most of the world? How much of what they pro1.

SABURO OKITA,

THE

DEVELOPING ECONOMIES AND JAPAN

94 (1980).
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posed would the United States accept--especially the United States
Congress? The full answers they found to these questions are too complex and lengthy to set out in this essay, so I shall single out just one
key part of each.
No one who took part in shaping the Bretton Woods world had any
doubt that much of the answer to what to do was defined by "the lessons of last time." It was essential to find ways to avoid the errors of
the Versailles peace settlement and also eliminate the conditions that had
brought on international financial instability, the depression, fascism, and
then World War II. These lessons were not just history; they were part
of living experience, all of it condensed into only twenty years. Does
this mean that the creators of the Bretton Woods world were fighting
the last war? My second thoughts led me to the conclusion that was the
right war to fight. It would not be making the errors of those who built
the Maginot Line so long as you also took account of some key changes in the world, notably in what people expected their governments to
do to avoid depressions and provide economic security.
The answer to the second question includes a long list of elements of
the Bretton Woods world that were put into the structure to make it
acceptable to one country or many that would be in quite different
positions at the end of the war. None was more important than finding
ways to permit countries to cope with their balance of payments difficulties without undermining the system's basic principles of liberalization and equal treatment. The complex rules set out in the fine print of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI') and the partial
exemption from the rules of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund that were put in for these purposes were not very
popular in the United States at the time. Many people said the Americans were once again losing out to clever foreigners in an international
negotiation. The learning process by which American economists and
civil servants had come to accept the need for such arrangements had
been crucial to the understandings with the British which underlay the
Bretton Woods agreements in trade as well as monetary matters. Although the interpretation and application of these provisions gave rise to
much trouble and controversy over a period of years, it hardly requires
a second thought to see that these measures-and other steps that filled
in gaps between production and consumption, such as the Marshall
Plan-were vital not only to the acceptance of the Bretton Woods arrangements, but also to their carrying them out.
As to the third question-how much of what the creators of Bretton
Woods worked for was accepted by the United States-my second

1254

AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10: 4

thoughts are the same as my first: more than might have been expected
and less than would have been desirable. It is true as Raymond Vernon
has pointed out that the "early positions of the U.S. team proposed to
constrain the behavior of national governments and to concede autonomous powers to international institutions to a far greater degree than
was to appear in the final agreements. ' He sees a similar process in
much of what the United States has done in working out other international economic agreements and ascribes this kind of behavior to the
peculiarities of the American political system. The case is well argued,
but it is also true that at Bretton Woods, and after, the United States
accepted an unprecedented number of international obligations and
agreed to follow policies drastically different from those it had pursued
in the past.
Other people have made it sound as if the United States got everything it wanted from the postwar settlements because the other countries
had no choice but to yield to its hegemony. That is not true. The United States was proposing a system of cooperation that would fail if it did
not provide benefits to all participants-or at least to most of the important ones. This required compromise all along the line. As the United
States was the strongest and richest, it goes almost without saying that
other countries were sometimes constrained to accept arrangements they
did not like because it was all the United States would agree to-a
position often determined by what American negotiators thought Congress would accept or insist on. Perhaps it does need saying-although
it is hardly a second thought-that putting restraints on American policies and creating obligations for the United States in the Bretton Woods
world were major objectives not only of foreign countries, but of the
Americans who did most to shape the Bretton Woods plans. That was
already true of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Only if
the United States behaved differently from the way it had in the 1920s
and 1930s could the principles of the Bretton Woods system be carried
out.
Over the last fifty years there have been quite a few second thoughts
about the Bretton Woods institutions. For a time after the war, these
institutions were hardly able to function because the world economy set
tasks beyond their strength. Then when they became able to work more
or less as planned, the world economy was quite different from what

2. Raymond Vernon, The U.S. Government at Bretton Woods and After, Bretton
Woods, N.H., Oct. 15-17, 1994 (paper prepared for the conference Bretton Woods
Revisited).
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had been assumed when they were created. Consequently, much of what
the Bretton Woods institutions do now is rather different from what was
expected at the beginning. For example, the International Monetary Fund
was never intended to be an important source of development financing;
the Marshall Plan, not the World Bank, became the main source of
funds for European reconstruction; the dollar standard, the core of the
international monetary system for so much of the postwar period,
worked quite differently from the system envisaged when the Bretton
Woods agreements were drawn up; the shift from semi-fixed to semifloating exchange rates was a drastic move away from one of the dominant ideas that had shaped the Bretton Woods world-but it was not the
"end of Bretton Woods" as it has so often been called.
One of the reasons second thoughts are imperative is that predictions
about international relations are so often wrong. Has there ever been a
process that provided as much material for what looked like sound
predictions as the history of Western European integration? There have
been plans, studies, and debates. One agreement has followed another,
often to make it more concrete or provide "the next step," all of them
parts of a string of continuing activities that were supposedly moving
toward a broadly agreed objective. At the end of the war, however, few
people thought that such an objective was to be taken seriously, because
under the Bretton Woods agreements, each government was presumed to
be responsible for its own national economy. After a while many people
came to believe that at least six countries would soon act as a single
state. The High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community was seen as
the first of a series of supranational agencies; none followed. Other
expectations have not materialized: Euratom's central part in providing
Europe's energy and security; the development of a common foreign
policy-or even a common trade policy; promised dates for a true monetary union. Much of the elaborate program for a symbolic year, 1992,
was set forth in the same terms used in the 1950s about the opening of
the Common Market-and then not carried out. British entry into the
European Community was off, then on, vetoed, and achieved, but with
reservations.
It is striking that two of the greatest authorities on European integration, one American and one British, who made their share of predictions, have underlined the problem in statements made thirty years apart.
In a book published in 1964, Miriam Camps observed that after the
French Assembly had voted against the idea of a European Defense
Community "anyone who had then predicted that the Six would soon be
actively engaged in the creation of tyro new Communities might reason-
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ably have been dismissed as a light-headed visionary."3 In a book published in 1994, Frangois Duchene said, " . . . it has taken over thirty
years for the EEC to erect most of the pillars of economic union it was
supposed to raise in a decade . . . The European Union has grown up
virtually in the opposite way to any of its supposed models."'
Another place where second and more thoughts about the Bretton
Woods world have been necessary is in following out the relations between trade and investment. And this, it turns out, is a matter on which
Sy Rubin and I were both working long ago, though not in the same
way, and not together.
The Liberal Trading System
At the time the Bretton Woods conference was setting up the Fund
and the Bank, work aimed at creating a complementary-and in many
ways comparable-body to deal with trade was well underway. Because
it was taking so long to get agreement on the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO), one part of that agreement was set in
motion in advance-the GATI. But the ITO never came into existence
and the "temporary" GATT has survived until now. Moreover, it worked
so well at first that by the end of the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties
it had brought about a far greater reduction of tariffs than any reasonable person expected in 1947. How it has fared since is another matter.
This brief story prompts many second thoughts. One of the ITO's
major strengths was that it covered a wider range of trade restrictions
than traditional agreements, but the GATT's relative narrowness proved
to be not a weakness but a strength. The President of the United States
could agree to it under the powers given him by the Trade Agreements
Act, whereas the ITO required action by Congress and that was where it
foundered. One of the main reasons President Truman decided to withdraw the Charter from Congress in 1950, before that body had taken
any action, was that most of the major American business organizations
were against it. They had complaints all along but would probably have
supported the Charter had it not been for the weak protection of the
rights of private investors provided by some clauses negotiated at the
final conference on the ITO in Havana in 1948. Those clauses, which

3. MIRIAM CAMPS, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1955-1963, at 20
(1964).
4. FRANqOIS DuCHENE, JEAN MONNET, THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 402 (1994).
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were certainly open to much objection, would not have been there if the
same business organizations had not persuaded the upper reaches of the
State Department-against the better judgment of most of its staff and
many outside observers-to try to strengthen the weak but probably
innocuous language about investment that had been adopted earlier.
There were other factors working against American acceptance of the
ITO but frequent second thoughts have not led me to abandon the judgment I formed in 1952 that this was the main cause of the demise of
the ITO. 5
I did not know then that Sy Rubin was the State Department official
stuck with the nearly impossible job of producing satisfactory language
when the United States was almost alone in arguing against the rest of
the world on what the Charter should say about investment. He had
managed the matter so well that his principal adviser from business had
said that the language that had been worked out would be acceptable.
After the signing of the Charter, however, the American business organizations held a discussion that led most of them to take the position that
the negative features of the Charter outweighed the advantages it might
bring.
Later efforts-usually spurred by business groups in the United States
and Western Europe-did not produce any strong multilateral agreements
about private investment. Nevertheless, investment has grown tremendously and has played a large part in shaping both the patterns of international trade and the great changes in the structure of world production
over the last fifty years. Would it have made much difference if there
had been an ITO Charter with either strong or weak investment provisions? Would it be wise to try now to get international agreement on "a
GATT for investment" as proposed from time to time? Is the inclusion
of trade-related investment provisions in the agreement for a new World
Trade Organization a good way to start that process? To answer these
questions one must deal with still others. In the time of the ITO people
thought in terms of American business investing abroad, mostly in certain kinds of activities. Now investments come from almost all countries
and may go anywhere; funds may come from a third country and technology and management from others. The ownership and "nationality" of
enterprises is often complicated, diffused, and sometimes confused. It is
hard to imagine a modem satisfactory comprehensive code on international investment that does not deal with intellectual property and condi-

5. William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATiONAL FiNANCE (1952).
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tions of competition and take account of a variety of
government-business relations. A rather long string of second thoughts
would be required to pursue these matters, not to mention the other
multiple facets of the world trading system. I will elaborate on only one
of them.
There was a period in the early 1980s when Sy Rubin brought me
into some discussions on the international economy conducted by the
American Society of International Law. One result was that in April
1983 I found myself presiding over a discussion of the question "Can
the GATT Resolve International Trade Disputes?" The first speaker
was Sir Roy Denman, then the head of the European Communities'
delegation in Washington. He complained of the disputes settlement
procedure in the GATT. Almost everyone did in those days and since,
but Sir Roy's emphasis-and not for the first time, I believe-was that
part of the trouble lay in the fact "that the United States was a very
litigious society and was frequently frustrated with the fact that it was
impossible to get a quick, or rather instantaneous, judgment . . . " He
thought matters "would be improved if the emphasis were placed on
conciliation and negotiation."
The first comment from the floor was by Professor Rubin who said
"that Sir Roy seemed to be taking a characteristic 'nonlawyer's attitude
toward lawyers and noted that when the United States talked about
improving the GATT it did not necessarily mean it wanted 'quick fixes,'
but rather that the parties should abide by the GATT rules." He was
certainly right that views about lawyers of the sort he ascribed to
Denman were nothing new. Visiting Nantucket in 1782, Cr~vecoeur was
pleased to find that there was only one lawyer making a living there.
Usually, he said, lawyers were numerous in populated places because

they are plants that will grow in any soil that is
cultivated by the hands of others . . .The fortunes
they daily acquire in every province, from the misfortunes of their fellow-citizens are surprising!
The most ignorant, the most bungling member of that
profession will, if placed in the most obscure part
of the country, promote litigiousness, and amass
more wealth without labor, than the most opulent

6. Proceedings, Seventy-Seventh Annual Meeting, The American Society of International Law, 287-92 (Washington, D.C., Apr. 14-16, 1983).
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farmer, with all his toils ... They have become
so necessary an evil in our present constitutions,
that it seems unavoidable and past all remedy ....
Behind the exchange between Denman and Rubin lay an old issue
that remains with us. The United States is often accused of taking a
legalistic approach that is unduly rigid and sometimes too simplistic to
deal properly with the complexities of modem commerce; Americans see
the appeal for "negotiation and conciliation" as an effort by the Europeans to evade their obligations. Both may be right part of the time.
As one who knows what a world without the GAT was like, and
saw that agreement formulated, I have always thought that the failure of
some countries to live up to the rules-and the inability or unwillingness of others to enforce them-was the largest part of the problem.
Too many "out of court" settlements are simply tests of strength that
deprive weaker countries of their rights. But then I had some second
thoughts when Miriam Camps and I were trying to get to the root of
the increasing difficulties the liberal trading system was encountering!
Failure to apply the rules was, of course, an important part of the story.
But the scale on which governments had, explicitly or tacitly, resorted to
arrangements that were not compatible with the GATT suggested something more. Great changes were taking place in the world economy,
often quite rapidly. The impact on individual countries or major industries was often severe, and out of these pressures came some of the
most troublesome measures that violated the principles, the aims, and
the letter of the GATT. To urge a stricter enforcement of rules would
be futile. What seemed to be needed was some means to work out
arrangements that would help bring about the necessary structural changes in trade and production and to press governments to make adjustments instead of blocking them.
That could be a risky course, as exemplified by the cotton textile
agreements. At the time we wrote they had for twenty years, in the
name of the GAFT and nominally under its supervision, not only permitted but fostered protection, discrimination, and bilateralism on a large
scale, all quite contrary to the principles of the GATT. Less formally,

7. J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEUR, LETRs FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER
153-55 (1957). Though he had farmed for twenty years in Orange County, New York,
and become a naturalized citizen, Cravecoeur never altogether lost his Frenchness.
8. See generally MIRiAMl CAmPs & WMI.WAMI DMBOLD, JR., THE NEw
MULTILATERALISM, CAN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM BE SAVED?

(1986).
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governments had taken steps-multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral-that,
in effect, took out of the GATT other major segments of world trade,
including steel, automobiles, and most agricultural products. When problems of this sort were really deep-rooted, it would strengthen, not weaken, the GATT to try to deal with the underlying problems by measures
going beyond traditional trade rules. At the same time, there had to be
better enforcement of most trade rules and improved arrangements for
settling disputes.
The GAIT had other weaknesses that could not be rectified by simply enforcing rules. It did little or nothing to force or induce countries
to end the use of safeguards or help them make adjustments that would
make it politically or economically acceptable to get rid of other barriers. Although the Tokyo Round adopted codes to deal with a few nontariff barriers, governments were not rushing to use them. Little or nothing had been done to adapt the GATT rules to the needs of the developing countries, or, for that matter, the problems of the older industrial
countries when newly industrializing countries became exporters of manufactured goods. After years of effort, Japan, one of the great trading
countries, still did not fit into the GAT system in a satisfactory manner. In all these matters it was not the "GATT" that was the problem
but the governments working through the GATT-or not working
through it.
This is not the place to rehearse the conclusions of The New
Multilateralism. Suffice it to say that we concluded that the system of
cooperation to liberalize trade that started with the launching of the
GATF in 1947 has deteriorated since the early 1970s. Although the
achievements in escaping from the postwar controls and the reduction of
tariffs up through the Kennedy Round had been remarkable, there was
no contemporary system capable of producing comparable results. If the
world trading system could be saved, as we asked in our subtitle, it
would have to be changed. When a distinguished group of experts met
to review a draft of our findings, Seymour Rubin was in the chair.
That does not make him responsible for what we said, whatever his
second thoughts on the trading system may be. For myself, I have found
no reason to change the basic analysis of that pamphlet whenever I have
reassessed these issues, even though there have been occasional improvements in cooperation and the behavior of some governments. Does the
inauguration of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) change the
situation fundamentally and set the trading system off in a new upward
direction? I cannot say.
The favorable judgments about the whole or parts of the WTO by
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some of my most knowledgeable and experienced friends have impressed me. Some of the bits and pieces that have come to my attention
look good, others do not. The broadening and strengthening of the
GATT that seem possible under some of the provisions are promising;
possibilities will open that did not exist before. But in trade policy as in
art and architecture, God is in the details-and so is the devil. I did not
follow the Uruguay Round negotiations closely nor have I studied the
final documents. I may never do so. I am daunted by their length and
think wistfully of the two and a half pages or so that sufficed for the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 that wrought such great
changes in American trade policy and is the real origin of the GAIT.
Even if the WTO passes the written test, so to speak, how will it work
in practice? That, like so many other things in this world, falls into that
large and unsatisfactory category of what "remains to be seen."
The Conscience of the Rich Nations
"Trade not aid" was for a long time a slogan that had a lot of support in both the rich and poor nations of the world. Today it might be
replaced by "Trade not debt," even while remembering that one of the
purposes of incurring the debt is to expand the trade. But aid was once
the dominant part of the subject to be discussed, and as Seymour Rubin
was for a time in the middle of one of the potentially most important
developments in the practice of aid, and wrote about it, this seems a
suitable focus for the last part of this article.' Here the second thoughts
are his but date from 1966. One wonders if his colleagues in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), where he was the American
representative from 1962 to 1964, ever thought he might someday write
about their work (though very discreetly and without names). There was
no one to warn them as Robert Bums warned his compatriots when
Francis Grose was compiling his Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue, "A
Chield's amang you takin' notes, and, faith, he'll prent it!"
DAC came after the DAG, as acronyms have a way of doing. This
was back in the days when the United States was the greatest provider
of aid to developing countries, and there was widespread confidence that
good could be achieved by the right kind of aid in the right places.
There was a strong conviction in Washington that the European coun-

9. This section is based on SEYMOUR RUBIN, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH
NATIONS: THE DEvELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMIT'EE AND THE CoMI toN AID EFORT (1966). The quotations that follow come from various places in the text.
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tries-with the Marshall Plan and the recovery that followed well behind
them-ought to be providing more aid, and to a wider range of countries. Japan was learning that it must think of itself as an advanced
industrial nation and not a leader of the poor part of the world. As a
result of American urging, DAG was created in 1960 and held a series
of meetings in different capitals. When the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEC)--which stimulated and supervised Westem European cooperation in handling Marshall aid, was transformed in
October 1961 into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), DAC succeeded DAG and became a committee of
the new organization. It drew on the staff and various activities of the
larger body but retained a largely independent existence.
DAC had the same assignment as DAG: to coordinate bilateral aid
programs. That sounded good. As Rubin says, "Co-ordination holds out
the happy prospect of achieving the virtues of multilateral, internationalized action without the pain of relinquishing charge of one's resources.
Whether this prospect is in fact realizable, or to what extent, is a serious question . . . ." He discusses the many kinds of coordination there
might be; quite a few were tried at one time or another by DAC in
what he calls "its process of defining by doing." He explains that the
results of coordination were limited mainly because "the difficulties lie
in the likelihood that agreement will be general while difference is specific." The book shows admirably what this last phrase means in its
discussion of the ways in which each national program had some special
characteristics, either in its economic structure and practices or in the
country's foreign policy aims. France was particularly concerned with its
former African colonies; Britain was committed to the Colombo Plan;
Germany wanted to support the Hallstein doctrine; the Japanese wanted
to expand and diversify markets. Although the United States hoped other
countries would give financial aid to the Alliance for Progress, it "did
not convey ...
any feeling that [it] ...
desired any advice . ... "
Everyone tried to find ways to tie aid to domestic sales, in reality if not
in form.
DAC became a good forum for discussion, a source of information
(including, as much as possible, statistics on a uniform basis), and an
arena for the exchange of advice, whether solicited or not (though always polite and restrained, Rubin says). Its principal modus operandi
was the collective examination of each member's aid policy and practice. The combination of emulation and criticism may have paid off.
Although it is usually all but impossible to say that such and such a
discussion in DAC produced a given response in a certain country, or in
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many, Rubin feels sure that "the 1961 review of aid doctrine in the
United States... led to an American policy of forty-year loans, carrying 3/4 percent interest (or service charge) and a ten-year grace period."
It is also very likely that the wish to make a respectable presentation in
DAC sometimes strengthened the position of aid officials against other
parts of their own governments, such as finance ministries.
We do not have many good studies of international organizations by
people who have taken part in them. Part of the lasting value of this
one is that it not only describes activities in quite concrete terms but
also comments on what arrangements have the most impact on the effectiveness of the work, which set back progress, and the like. Rubin
discusses, for instance, the question of who comes to the sessions, what
responsibilities they have at home, how high and low levels of representation affect what can be done, whether annual meetings at a ministerial
level are useful, the way differences in views in national capitals affect
a country's influence in DAC, and many other things. Although he emphasizes the extent to which DAC may have helped developing countries find some common ground with the rich nations, he is blunt about
the value of limited membership. It is a point worth underlining in a
time when "participation" is rated so highly, but attention is not always
given to what Miriam Camps called the "efficiency-participation dilemma."
Too often, alumni either celebrate everything that was done by the
international organizations in which they served or are disillusioned and
condemning. Sy Rubin, as we would expect, is his usual sensible self in
the way he sets out the slightly murky record of the early years of
DAC, an effort that was as necessary, and perhaps as inevitable, as it
was highminded. He also gives us a graphic and attractive account of
how the keepers of the conscience of the rich went about their business.
The meeting place, he reminds us, "is not the usual sanitized and
characterless public building." It is the Chateau de la Muette, the headquarters of the OECD near the Bois de Boulogne, a former home of
Rothschilds.
"The room is large, with windows that run from floor to ceiling, open
onto a flagstone terrace, and look toward a well-groomed lawn. Beyond,
one hears the murmur of Paris traffic ... Inside is the U-shaped table
which is the mark of the international meeting .... "
"The weak sunshine of Paris filters through the windows as the delegates arrive. There is a quiet bustle of chairs being pulled back, of
words of recognition and greeting, or muted conversation as one delegate or another mutters a few words of comment or persuasion to his

1264

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 10:4

colleague, or confers hastily with a Secretariat member ......
"At the end of the Paris day, the delegates rise, stretch, fold papers,
fill briefcases, and hasten back to offices for the inevitable reporting
telegrams, prior to the evening round of receptions or dinners. Small
groups gather in the corridors, sometimes talking of the day's discussion, making an additional point or hammering one home, hoping to
influence a colleague or to explain a point that was intentionally or
otherwise not apparent in the meeting. Wishes for a pleasant return to
capitals, words in anticipation of meeting at the next session, are exchanged. Another DAC session is over."
As there was always another day for DAC, so there have been many
other days in which the trading system has gone on, for better or worse,
within the framework of the Bretton Woods world, which continues to
blend change and continuity. In these and in other fields that we have
not touched upon, Seymour Rubin, too, has gone on, to the pleasure and
benefit of all of us.

A SMALL STEP FORWARD FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE CREATION OF THE POST OF UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Christina M. Cerna
Many years ago, perhaps more than either of us wishes to acknowledge, I was a student of Professor Rubin's at the Washington College of
Law of The American University. Professor Rubin was, at that time, involved with a United Nations commission that had something to do with
transnational corporations. From my student perspective, I interpreted his
role in the United Nations to be that of taking the transnational corporations to task for illegal monopolistic activities and exposing them to
worldwide condemnation. Somehow I imagined that Professor Rubin
worked for the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the
United States State Department, American University and the American
Society for International Law, all at the same time. I took his seminar
on International Business Transactions and although I did not follow in
his footsteps in that area of the law, Professor Rubin was an inspiration
for me to seek employment with an international organization. For the
past sixteen years I have worked professionally in the field of international human rights law. I spent most of those years at the Washington,
D.C. headquarters of the Organization of American States, but the last
two years were spent (on loan) with the United Nations at the United
Nations Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. A little over a year ago,
during my tenure at the Centre the United Nations General Assembly
took the historic decision to create the post of U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights. This essay will take a look at the creation of that
post and the High Commissioner's activities over the past year.

* Organization of American States. Affiliation for identification purposes only.

The opinion are those of the author alone and are not to be attributed to the Organization of American States or any of its organs.
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This year, the United Nations is celebrating its Fiftieth Anniversary.
Fifty years after the adoption of the United Nations Charter in San
Francisco, the purposes of the United Nations "to maintain international
peace and security"' and "to achieve international co-operation" 2 in
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"3 are again receiving international attention. In the absence of a
global unifying force, in this age of shrinking distances due to the tremendous technological advances in worldwide communications and
transportation, the United Nations, at fifty, is being looked to, once
again, as a potentially relevant body.
In June 1993, the United Nations convened the second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria.4 It was originally planned to
be held in Berlin, which would have had great symbolic value given the
fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany's recent reunification, the reunification
of Europe and the fact that the international human rights movement
began in reaction to the Nazi atrocities committed during the Second
World War. Unfortunately, the Germans withdrew their invitation and
the Austrians stepped in, offering to host the Conference in Vienna. The
connotations that Vienna conjures up hark back either to a different era,
or to an unfinished (un-begun?) self-examination of Austria's role in the
War.
The Austrian team was obliging, hard-working and ultimately ingratiating. Everyone liked them and Vienna turned out to be a much more
congenial and embracing city than Geneva whence so many of the diplomatic participants came in order to attend the Conference. Vienna was
only a few hundred miles, however, from the conflict raging in Bosnia.
This geographic fact served as a constant reminder of the international
community's failure to act in the Bosnian conflict. The year-long preparatory process before the World Conference, in Geneva, had also been
fraught with conflict and bitterness. The slightest advances towards an
agenda for the Conference were frustrated by those countries that did
not wish to see the conference take place at all. The inability to achieve
consensus on an agenda meant that one finally had to be handed down
from headquarters in New York, reducing the efforts of the Genevabased diplomats to naught.

1.
2.
3.
4.

U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 91 1.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 913.
Id.
The first was held in Teheran, Iran in 1968.
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After some initially horrific bad press once the Conference opened-a
protest by the invited Nobel Prize winners after the World Conference
refused to seat the Dalai Lama, having succumbed to Chinese pressure;
and the wholesale booing of former United States President Jimmy
Carter by the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) forum-the Conference did manage to produce a final document. The Working Document of the Conference had been drafted by Mr. Ibrahima Fall, the
Senegalese Secretary-General of the Conference. That document, recycled by the Conference's Drafting Committee, became the albatross
known as the "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action."5
The Vienna Declaration is being cited routinely in the Palais des
Nations in Geneva these days. The Declaration is comprised of
everyone's ideas, even if these ideas are totally contradictory. Consequently, the document can be used to support almost any proposition
one chooses to make. For example, many cite to the fifth paragraph of
the Declaration concerning universality, or perhaps more appropriately,
cultural relativism:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is
the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.6
If all rights are "indivisible and interdependent and interrelated" and
must be treated "in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and
with the same emphasis," then any attempt to set priorities would appear
to violate the spirit of the Vienna Conference. Why then is universal
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child set for 1995,
whereas universal ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women set for the year 2000?
The Vienna Conference might have been better off recycling the
Proclamation of Teheran from the first World Conference on Human
Rights held in 1968. Three regional blocs (the Americas, Africa and
Asia) presented short Declarations of their own, but none rang with the

5. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).

6. Id.at 1665.
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necessary eloquence to take center stage to become the Working Document of the Vienna Conference. Mr. Fall's document did not ring with
the necessary eloquence either, but the fact that the Secretary-General of
the Conference had gone to the trouble to produce a document, and
such a lengthy one at that, gave it a certain pride of place. A power
struggle, however, took place first. After stating that he had merely
sought to be useful to the process, the Secretary-General of the World
Conference did not offer to withdraw his document, once submitted to
the Preparatory Committee, but instead faced down governmental charges that he had exceeded his authority in presenting it, with the intention
that it be used as the Conference's Working Document on a par with
the regional declarations. The West came to his rescue, having produced
no regional declaration of its own and virtually adopted Mr. Fall's document. The Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG), notably Europe,
Canada and the United States, had decided not to organize a regional
meeting and thus did not produce a document which would represent
the views of the West at the Vienna Conference. The West's lack of
interest in presenting a united proposal was explained away by comments such as "everyone knows the West's point of view as regards
human rights" or as an attempt to avoid a deliberate imposition of
Western values on the rest of the world. At the very last minute, during
the ad hoc third week of the fourth and final Preparatory Committee
meeting (a month before the Vienna Conference), several Western
States, singly or collectively, put together a number of ideas, the only
memorable one being the adoption of Amnesty International's proposal
for the creation of the post of High (Special) Commissioner for Human
Rights by the United States. As a result, WEOG was ready to adopt the
draft declaration prepared by the Secretary-General of the Conference.
The Vienna Conference will be remembered, if at all, for having led
to the creation of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights, an
idea which had not been included in the draft Working Document prepared by the Secretary-General of the Conference. The United States
deservedly can take credit for promoting the idea of High Commissioner
and helping to bring about the creation of the post. The member states
of the United Nations apparently did not choose to reward Mr. Fall for
his efforts in drafting the Working Document which became the Vienna
Declaration because they did not make him the High Commissioner.
Instead, Mr. Jos6 Ayala Lasso, the Ambassador of Ecuador to the
United Nations in New York, was selected as the first United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ambassador Ayala headed the
Working Group in New York which led to the adoption by the General
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Assembly of resolution 48/141 of December 20, 1993 which created the
post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Mr.
Ayala's negotiating skills reportedly turned into reality what had first
appeared to be only a far-off possibility. The member states rewarded
his achievement by offering him the post of High Commissioner. On
April 5, 1994, the High Commissioner assumed his duties in Geneva.
Almost a year has since elapsed. The High Commissioner is mandated to report annually on his activities to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, and through the Economic and Social Council, to the
General Assembly. He has now presented two reports, one to the United
Nations General Assembly7 and the other to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.8
The opening paragraphs of the High Commissioner's report to the
United Nations General Assembly read like the Vienna Declaration. For
example, the report states that the High Commissioner acts according to
three "principles," one of which is to take "a comprehensive and integrated approach to the promotion of human rights."' Such an approach,
the report continues, "means that those rights are understood to be civil,
cultural, economic, political and social rights, as well as the right to
development, to be dealt with on an equal footing and in a fair and
even-handed manner."'
Once past this language we can begin to piece together what the
High Commissioner has actually accomplished during the period between
April 1994 and January 1995. He has made official visits to Switzerland, Austria, Bhutan, Cambodia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Nepal, Norway, the Republic of Korea
and Sweden. In addition, the High Commissioner visited Cuba in November 1994, and Colombia in December 1994, each at the invitation of
the respective Government. More importantly he made two trips to
Rwanda and also Burundi. He has also met with the Special Rapporteur,
experts, chairpersons of working groups and treaty bodies, United Nations specialized agencies, regional organizations, NGOs, etc.

7. Report of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights, A/49136,
Nov. 11, 1994.
8. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
F/CN.411995/98, Feb. 15, 1995.
9. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 49th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A149/36 (1994) [hereinafter Report].
10. Id.
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RIGHTS FIELD OPERATION iN RWANDA

The events in Rwanda in April 1994 provided the High Commissioner with his first opportunity to respond to serious violations of human
rights. In response to the High Commissioner's initiative, a Special
Session of the United Nations Human Rights Commission was held on
May 24-25, 1994 to consider the serious human rights situation in
Rwanda. At the end of the session, the Commission decided to appoint
a Special Rapporteur to Rwanda, who was mandated to seek out all
credible and reliable information on violations and atrocities committed
in that country. The Special Rapporteur, Mr. Ren6 Dengi-S6gui of the
Ivory Coast, visited Rwanda three times and presented two reports contamining his observations and recommendations. The Human Rights Commission also decided that the Special Rapporteur should be assisted by a
team of human rights field officers. Presently, there are approximately
one hundred human rights field officers throughout the country. The
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR) of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is the first field operation
of the High Commissioner and according to the Operational Plan, is
designed "to create conditions instilling confidence among Rwandese
citizens, and in particular, those most vulnerable elements of Rwandan
society, such as refugees and internally displaced persons, so that they
eventually return to their country and homes to resume their lives in
safety and dignity.""

On July 1, 1994, after the United Nations Human Rights Commission
created the post of Special Rapporteur to Rwanda, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Resolution 935 (1994), requesting the
Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine and
analyze information concerning violations of international humanitarian
law and genocide in Rwanda and to present its conclusions to the Council before November 30, 1994.12 The Secretary-General in his report to
the Security Council of July 26, 1994 announced that the Commission
would be based in Geneva and would benefit from the resources of the
High Commissioner, and in particular, would have access to those resources already made available to the Special Rapporteur to Rwanda.
The High Commissioner was requested to ensure coordination between
the work of the Commission of Experts and the Special Rapporteur. The
Commission undertook a mission to Rwanda in August-September 1994

11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 18.
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and presented an interim report to the Secretary-General on
September 30, 1994, which recommended, inter alia, the establishment
of an international tribunal.
The HRFOR was created as a result of United Nations Human Rights
Commission Resolution S-3/1, establishing the mandate of a Special
Rapporteur, Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), establishing the
Commission of Experts, and General Assembly Resolution 48/141, establishing the mandate of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to the Operational Plan, the field operation in Rwanda has four
objectives: (a) to carry out investigations into violations of human rights
and humanitarian law; (b) to monitor the ongoing human rights situation
and, through its presence, prevent future human rights violations; (c) to
cooperate with other international agencies in re-establishing confidence,
and thus facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and the
rebuilding of civic society; and (d) to implement programmes of technical cooperation in the field of human rights, particularly in the area of
the administration of justice. 3
The High Commissioner's field operation in Rwanda is carrying out
investigations into violations of human rights and humanitarian law, is
monitoring the human rights situation for the purposes of the mandate
of the Special Rapporteur, is cooperating with other international agencies in re-establishing confidence and facilitating the return of refugees
and displaced persons and the rebuilding of civic society, and is implementing programmes of technical cooperation. The High Commissioner
has presented a detailed operation plan for the human rights field operation in Rwanda and has participated in a consolidated appeal on Rwanda
organized by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Geneva. As of
January 13, 1995, some US$4.46 million dollars had been pledged to
finance the field operation in Rwanda, but only US$1.80 million dollars
had been paid in. The High Commissioner made an additional request
for US$4.83 million dollars for a programme of technical assistance for
the administration of justice.
The HRFOR is the first field operation ever undertaken by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. Its activities are comparable to those
of the human rights components of the peacekeeping missions established in El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti and Guatemala. The human
rights components of these missions have been criticized for having
been organized by New York without the participation of the Centre for
Human Rights in Geneva. It will be an interesting exercise to evaluate
13. Id.at 19.
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the performance of the first field operation undertaken by the High
Commissioner and the Centre and to compare its achievements with
those of the earlier four missions.
PREVENTIVE ACTION IN BURUNDI

In neighboring Burundi, the High Commissioner established an office
on June 15, 1994 to carry out a preventive human rights programme.
This programme includes training and educational activities, particularly
for the judiciary, police, gendarmerie and military; technical assistance
for the Minister of Justice; human rights training for the Army; advisory
services of experts on human rights; human rights education; human
rights fellowships for the preparation of human rights experts; a system
for the production and distribution of human rights documentation; development of promotional activities designed to create a culture of human rights; support for the Centre for Human Rights of Bujumbura; and
assistance to national human rights NGOs. The High Commissioner, in
the face of a deteriorating human rights situation in Burundi in early
1995, called on the international community to increase the deployment
of human rights field officers in that country. The High Commissioner
commented that an increased deployment of field officers would "play
an especially useful deterrent role with respect to violations of human
rights,""4 stressing that "there is an imperative need to act so as to establish a climate of tolerance and mutual respect whereby each and
every citizen of the Republic is not considered a Tutsi or a Hutu but a
member of the Burundese nation."' 5 In February 1995, in view of the
deteriorating human rights situation, the Security Council decided to
send a mission to Burundi.
In January and February 1995, the High Commissioner also turned his
attention to the human rights situation in Chechnya and former Yugoslavia.
ADVISORY SERVICES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Great attention in the High Commissioner's Repbrt to the United Nations General Assembly is devoted to advisory services and technical
and financial assistance. Assistance, pursuant to the Vienna Declaration,
must be "at the request of Governments" and in the following areas:

14. Report, supra note 9, at 13.
15. Id.
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helping States draft national plans of action for human rights that the
United Nations could support; building democratic institutions; human
rights aspects of elections; the administration of justice; the training of
police and others; and areas involving the rights of children, minorities
and indigenous populations. 6
ASSISTING COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

In order to assist countries in "transition to democracy," the High
Commissioner visited Cambodia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi and
Nepal. The Centre for Human Rights has opened an office in Cambodia,
the purpose of which is:
to manage the implementation of educational, advisory services and technical assistance programmes and to ensure their continuation; to assist the
Government of Cambodia in meeting its obligations under the human
rights instruments Cambodia has acceded to, including the preparation of
reports to the relevant monitoring committees; to assist with the drafting
and implementation of legislation to promote and protect human rights; to
assist in training persons responsible for the administration of justice; to
contribute to the creation and/or strengthening of national institutions for
the promotion and protection of human rights; and to provide support to
bona fide human rights groups.'
Although the Cambodia office provides advice and technical assistance
to the Cambodian authorities, there are indications that these same individuals are reluctant to heed it.
The High Commissioner has also signed a Joint Declaration of Cooperation for the Development of Programmes for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Malawi, which will run for two years beginning January 1, 1995. According to the High Commissioner's Report to
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the programme covers
several areas of priority need, "such as constitutional reform, assistance
to the judiciary, training of the police and the military, human rights
education in primary and secondary schools, support to the civil society,
and support to Parliament and to structures concerned with the administration of justice."' 8 The High Commissioner for Human Rights opened
an office in Lilongwe for the purpose of implementing the cooperation
programme.

16. Id.
17. Id.at 13-14.
18. Id.at 15.
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Regarding his visit to the Baltic Countries, the High Commissioner
met with the Heads of State of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and discussed
the development of national action plans in human rights, among other
issues. In Eastern and Central Europe, the High Commissioner has several programmes dealing with the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. They involve constitutional and legislative assistance; human
rights training in the administration of justice, for teachers, police and
prison administrators; assistance for parliamentarians, academic institutions and NGOs; and assistance in human rights aspects of the electoral
process. The High Commissioner also visited Nepal to discuss a
programme for technical assistance in the field of human rights.
CONCLUSION
The idea of the post of High Commissioner is almost as old as the
human rights movement itself. Mr. Ayala Lasso, in the face of great
odds, must be given excellent marks for an extremely impressive first
year on the job. The Rwanda operation is perhaps the High
Commissioner's baptism by fire and while one may criticize certain
aspects of his approach to the issues, one can only be pleased that he
took on the big issues immediately.
While the High Commissioner for Human Rights is engaged in "restructuring" the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, perhaps he
ought to rely on the regional organizations a bit more. The African
Commission of Human Rights could have been assigned the role given
the Special Rapporteur or the Commission in Rwanda. The High Commissioner should strengthen whatever regional mechanisms already exist
and help to make these mechanisms more effective. The author would
also like to see him convince the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe that the admission of Russia and former Yugoslavia is all the
more urgent given the terrible events in Chechnya and in Bosnia, rather
than using these events as grounds to keep them out. Once the regional
arrangements actively begin to concern themselves about the serious
human rights violations in their regions, the High Commissioner can
concentrate his efforts on creating a regional arrangement where one is
still totally lacking-in Asia.

